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In the days since the Abbott government released its first budget, the Labor Party, the Greens and the Palmer United Party have all said they will block parts of it in the Senate. Threats to block the…
In the days since the Abbott government released its first budget, the Labor Party, the Greens and the Palmer United Party have all said they will block parts of it in the Senate.
Threats to block the budget bring back memories of 1975 when the opposition, led by Malcolm Fraser, used its numbers in the Senate to stall the passage of the appropriation bills (sometimes referred to as “supply”). This ultimately led to the then governor-general, Sir John Kerr, taking the extraordinary step of dismissing the Whitlam government.
But would blocking aspects of the Abbott government’s budget bring about a similar constitutional crisis, the likes of which we have not seen since 1975?
Following the announcement of the budget, a mass of legislation necessary to implement the new policies and allow the government to spend money is introduced into parliament. The legislation falls broadly into three categories:
The implementation of the Abbott government’s budget depends upon the passage of all three types of legislation. Based on the mutterings from Labor and the minor parties so far, this year it will most likely be the latter two categories that receive the greatest attention on the floor of the Senate.
The government can’t simply take money from the Treasury. Parliament must pass legislation, known as “appropriation” legislation, authorising the government to dip into the Treasury’s coffers. On the night of Treasurer Joe Hockey’s budget speech, three appropriation bills were introduced into parliament.
The first of these bills deals with the “ordinary annual services of the government”. This first bill provides government departments and agencies with the funding necessary to operate day-to-day services, including paying public servants’ wages.
The second bill deals with the authorisation of funds for items that are not “ordinary annual services of the government”. This will include, for example, funding for public works, the acquisition of sites and buildings or grants to the states.
The third bill provides money for the running of parliament itself.
The reason for multiple appropriation bills is that Section 54 of the Constitution requires that a bill dealing with the appropriation of money:
…for the ordinary annual services of the government shall deal only with such appropriation.
Other appropriations must, therefore, be dealt with in separate legislation. The reason for this is to prevent the government tacking important new programs onto these bills and forcing the Senate’s hand.
The way in which the legislation is structured to conform with the constitutional requirements has implications for senators seeking to block aspects of the budget.
For example, the money required to run organisations such as the ABC or the CSIRO is contained within the first appropriation bill as it is part of the “ordinary annual services of the government”. Senators seeking to block the budget cuts to the ABC or the CSIRO would need to vote against the first appropriation bill.
As constitutional law expert Anne Twomey has noted, it is unlikely that Labor would join the minor parties or independents in blocking supply in this way. As a consequence, the Senate blocking budget cuts to existing services seems doubtful, so we are unlikely to see a repeat of 1975.
The government’s “debt levy”, which proposes an increase to the top marginal tax rate by 2% for three years, is likely to face stern opposition in the Senate.
The debt levy is not included in the appropriation bills, but is instead part of a separate set of bills – primarily, the Tax Laws Amendment (Temporary Budget Repair Levy) Bill 2014.
The proposed legislation dealing with the debt levy is separate to the appropriation bills because it is a function of two constitutional requirements and allows the Senate to scrutinise each proposed new tax separately. First, there is the aforementioned issue of Section 54 of the Constitution. In addition, Section 55 of the Constitution requires that laws dealing with taxation can only deal with taxation, and only one subject of taxation.
The effect of Section 55 is that where a government seeks to introduce taxes on different subjects, each tax must be dealt with in a separate bill.
Section 53 of the Constitution prevents the Senate amending bills dealing with taxation or the appropriation of money for the ordinary annual services of the government. However, it can request such amendments be made by the House of Representatives.
Given the vocal opposition to the debt levy, it would appear that non-government senators are more likely to reject the tax outright than to seek amendments from the lower house.
The Senate blocking supply of funding to existing schemes or services is unlikely. But what about where the budget has proposed changes to the scheme or service itself?
For example, could the Senate block the proposed A$7 GP co-payment or the establishment of the Medical Research Future Fund? These initiatives would require either new legislation or amendments to existing legislation. As such, they would be open to review by the Senate.
In the case of the proposed co-payment, amendments would presumably need to be made to the Health Insurance Act 1973. When scrutinising normal legislation such as this, the Senate has the same powers as the lower house.
The composition of the Senate is set to change on July 1 this year. This, coupled with the way in which the Constitution requires many of these budget measures to be dealt with in separate pieces of legislation, means that each initiative could receive close scrutiny from the Senate.
While the Senate is unlikely to block the appropriation bills and prevent the day-to-day running of services, the close scrutiny that other aspects of the budget are likely to receive could stall and frustrate some of the government’s key reforms.
by Dr_Tad · May 18, 2014
We are very concerned about the risk that savings are falling too heavily on some families and young people trying to find work.
—Jennifer Westacott, Chief Executive of the Business Council of Australia
I don’t think even the colleagues realise the extent to which Tony has locked in a strategy from which he cannot turn back. … We have nowhere to go back to if it doesn’t get up. The budget strategy would be buggered.
Spare a thought for Tony Abbott.
No, really.
Because unless you understand — nay, really feel — his predicament with this year’s Budget then you will not be able to get whether he’s pursuing a full-blooded, hard Right, neoliberal, one-sided class war style assault on the mass of ordinary people or a desperate, crazy-brave, crash-or-crash-through strategy to restore lost authority and ward off the threat to the Coalition’s fragile 2013 patchwork of voter support posed by Clive Palmer’s dramatic ascent.
Now, what I’m asking from you here is not sympathy. It would be hard to find many people capable of that in relation to Abbott, as opinion polls before and after the election have made clear. But unless you have some empathy, some ability to imagine what it’s like to walk in his shoes and that of his government, then you will fail to grasp the government’s problems and instead of hurrying along its dissolution you might accidentally help it to a new lease of life, however improbable that may seem now.
Well, how did we get here?
Let’s recap briefly what’s been happening in Australian politics in recent years. There has been dramatic hollowing out of the social bases of the established political system (most especially in the decay of Laborism’s trade union roots), resulting in growing detachment of the political class from society, narrowing of programmatic differences between the major parties, and the rise of a powerful anti-political popular mood. This has led to growing electoral volatility and a decline in the proportion of votes commanded by the established parties. Abbott’s brief time at the top has accelerated recognition of anti-politics. As Possum recently noted on Twitter, “The rest of Australia has become like Qld in they way they relate to politics” — utter contempt for politicians as a group, massive swings, and voting against rather than for parties and governments, etc.
On the Left, Labor’s problems allowed space for the rise of The Greens. On the Right the Liberals and Nationals experienced organizational decay and internal brawling after their raison d’être as anti-Laborist bastions was rendered irrelevant by Laborism’s embrace of the neoliberal project in the 1980s. Labor’s agonies were briefly interrupted by Kevin Rudd’s leadership, which stood against Laborism and connected with the mood against the “old politics”. But with his climate surrender of 2010, the union-factional forces in the party reasserted themselves only to prove definitively that their project was moribund. Labor watched its support plunge to depths not seen since the Depression.
The wider Left tended to buy into part or all of Labor’s self-justifications that its problems were the result of Abbott’s evil genius, the machinations of all-powerful mining billionaires, the propaganda power of the Murdoch empire, and (most problematically) a vast pool of reaction within the suburban working class, expressing itself in racist hatred of asylum seekers and misogynistic rejection of our first female prime minister. This led to an almost uncritical view of the politics of the ALP-Greens alliance, as well as a gross overestimation of the Right’s strengths.
In reality, Abbott won mostly because he was not Labor (or the Greens). He was able to tie Labor’s lack of authority and loss of control of the political agenda to his and Hockey’s argument on “debt and deficits” — portrayed as a chaotic loss of control over the national finances. The real source of Labor’s problems was not debt but declining authority based in the breakdown of Laborism. The same goes for Abbott’s “border sovereignty”, “leadership chaos” and “broken promises” mantras. That is, Labor’s real structural problems lent credence tovarious stories told to explain the mess, but especially the economic tale in a post-GFC period of growing anxiety about the end of the mining construction boom.
Abbott also had to keep his own side under tight control because the hard Right agendas of the Coalition’s core supporters (whether free market IPAers or socially conservative culture warriors) were even more unpopular than the Opposition Leader himself. In the end, by keeping their heads down, the Coalition parties were able to beat back the threat posed by Rudd’s return, even if the detailed results and sudden rise of the Palmer United Party suggested that the headline 2PP figure hid the weakness of Abbott’s position.
Coalition drift and malaise
Now we can understand why Abbott’s is the poorest performing new government in the polls in 40 years. Its various bizarre culture war forays may have kept some of the hard Right happy temporarily but they also underlined the irrelevance of much of that agenda to modern Australian society, and in the end allowed the government to drift — perhaps most seriously with Abbott’s “knights and dames”. The latter was the point at which even the right-wing commentariat started to get nerves. Abbott’s tin ear on MP expenses, interventions into domestic politics by the Indonesians, and the Grand Guignol of ICAC didn’t help either. Unhappiness with his Paid Parental Leave scheme led someone in the inner circle to leak the “deficit levy” to pressure their leader, and the lead-up to Budget day was characterized by an unprecedented sense of chaos. All this while polling headed further south and community anxiety was heightened by the Commission of Audit’s wishlist.
But, as I wrote of the government’s problems in December:
None of this means that Abbott can’t still do nasty things, especially to vulnerable groups like asylum seekers, and especially to try to address his lack of authority. His supporters may even demand a big bang reform package to stem the malaise, one that he will feel unable to refuse.
This is what is coming to pass in the shape of Hockey’s Budget, which is much more contradictory than the cries of class warfare from the Left suggest, but which is characterized by the imposition of especially destructive attacks on a series of highly disadvantaged social groups, including retired workers, the young unemployed and poor people with health problems — attacks which Hockey in particular has brazenly and callously defended.
Rather than being a coherent government in a confident position to attack multiple groups in civil society, Abbott and co have decided to pick some ugly fights to prove they are still a force to be reckoned with. In this sense they are betting on getting assistance from their few remaining political advantages — Labor’s continuing disarray and navel gazing, the willingness by most left-wing civil society organisations (e.g. unions, peak welfare groups, NGOs) to accept their constituencies must play a part in “budget repair”, and the still manageable threat posed by Clive Palmer.
One major misapprehension on the Left is that the especially vicious parts of the Budget are about some kind of consistent neoliberal-austerity program. In fact there is little consistent about the Budget, which is a mix of mild stimulus, infrastructure spending, temporary retention of Gonski and NDIS as promised, a pared down PPL, further liberalization of higher education that builds on past Coalition and Labor shifts, 16,500 job cuts in the APS (a relatively small increase on what Labor’s “efficiency dividend” had been expected to deliver), and a push to “recycle” (privatise and buy) assets. The most important budgetary move is a staggering cut of $80 billion to the states for hospitals and schools, intended to rearrange federal-state responsibilities.
The actual economics of the Budget have little to do with its newly “hardline” politics, with projections that a return to surplus will be much later than the dates Abbott and Hockey repeatedly castigated Labor for, and a careful eye on not strangling weak post-GFC growth. This is not über-Thatcherism designed to reshape society, but a pragmatic attempt to keep the economy sputtering along while renovating government balance sheets (in particular by palming off responsibilities to the states) enough for “future-proofing” operations ahead; i.e. for throwing money at another financial crisis.
So what exactly is the newfound “toughness” about? To show that the government has a clear agenda it is willing to take a risk to drive through, in the “national interest”. In this way the malaise, the aimlessness, and the loss of authority of the last eight months are to be corrected. A big political confrontation where Abbott beats his opponents by a slender margin — perhaps even losing a swag of MPs in a double dissolution — has become more attractive to the government than attempting to rebuild its political position piecemeal. Given how badly Gillard’s patient approach fared politically, this is not an insane assessment. Abbott’s favoured political options are shaped and constrained by what has come before. As Laura Tingle argues, Rudd and Gillard’s inability to crush the Greens threat is informing Abbott’s approach to PUP, keen to deny the ex-LNP maverick any appearance of controlling the government’s plans. And they have set up a stoush with the states in order to lay the ground for major changes to the federation, perhaps including a big increase to the GST.
The problem for Abbott is, of course, that such a high-risk move may end up being “not so much about control as it is about losing it”.
Labor’s campaign against Abbott’s sinister deceit tax (debt levy) that it, er, won’t be voting against
A weak, disoriented Left
This explains why Shorten’s response — despite appearing more spirited and less acquiescent than previous efforts by Labor oppositions — is so misdirected and inadequate. Shorten puffs up the horrors of the Budget (“a Budget that goes out of its way to create an underclass”) rather than exposing its contradictions, and focuses on Abbott’s “lies” and “broken promises” rather than the government’s brittleness. While he rejects the idea there is a Budget emergency he then negates himself with a commitment to the “task” of balancing the Budget, thereby conceding the core of Hockey’s argument. Voters may not like the harshness of Hockey’s measures, or that they involve broken promises, but they are more likely to accept such policies if they think they’re necessary.
Christine Milne at least does fully reject the “Budget emergency” myth but also falls into the trap of seeing the cuts as driven by some kind of radical social program (“a vicious attack on the fabric of our society…driven from the Institute of Public Affairs, from Rupert Murdoch”), and is keen to spruik her preferred taxes to address the (non-existent) problem. Rather than calling for Abbott’s targets to resist she portrays them as passive victims needing the Greens to rescue them: “[T]he full weight is carried by those who have no power to fight back — the young, the sick, pensioners, students and those least able to shoulder it”. Her claim that voters were “conned” by Abbott’s spin neither fits with his pre-election unpopularity nor the general distrust of all politicians that dominates among the public.
Both Milne and Shorten base their threats to vote against parts of the Budget on exactly the kind of moral outrage and warnings of doom that utterly failed to save the Left from heavy defeat against such an unimpressive opponent last September. And while both challenge Abbott to “bring it on”, only Clive Palmer calmly deals with Abbott’s bluffs as if he understands the latter’s weakness, as he did in this remarkable performance on ABC’s Lateline last week.
I never imagined that the Prime Minister would do such things that he’s done in this budget to Australians and I think if he’s capable of doing that, his judgment may be right off and he might go to an election politically, but that’s a matter for him. Certainly it would be much better for the Australian people to decide.
Palmer has an acute ability to mobilise anti-political sentiment and to put a more compelling case for some of the Left’s historic preoccupations than the ALP and Greens seem capable of making. Palmer doesn’t just brush aside the debt crisis as a “fairy tale”; he also argues for an economic approach of large-scale stimulus, something not even the Greens have dared to float. Perhaps most importantly, he paints the Coalition’s nastiness as driven not by grand plans to reshape social relations but self-serving ideological fixations out of touch with the public interest. And if initial polling suggesting that more people think the Budget will be bad for the economy than good, this kind of argument may be pushing at an open door.
This is not to say that Palmer’s project is socially progressive or radical. Far from it. It is much more a vehicle for delivering on his business interests and getting revenge on his former political allies. Rather, he presents a sharp political contrast to business as usual. More significantly, if the WA special election is any guide, he seems to pull support from both Liberal and Labor voters. It is no wonder that he figures so much in Abbott’s calculations right now.
This, in the end, is the central point: Abbott’s problems are not just the product of his personal unpopularity (publicly and internally) and many missteps since September, but of how the structural crisis of politics has played out for the Right. Just because he is in trouble doesn’t mean the Left’s structural problems will be resolved by default. The fact Palmer is able to both unsettle Abbott and outflank a Left that has to date made only minor gains from the government’s problems is a sign of things to come, one that progressives ignore at their peril.
Having set the scene, over the coming weeks I plan to write some briefer posts developing an analysis of the changing balance of political forces.
– See more at: http://left-flank.org/2014/05/18/dazed-confused-budget-left-palmer-threat/#sthash.BxsW8omo.dpuf
COALITION CONTINUE TO SLIDE
Support for the Coalition continues to slide as the first Budget for the new Government approaches. So far, the Coalition has been unable to convince voters of the need for austerity and there is widespread opposition to some of the revenue saving measures being proposed in the Budget.
Primary Vote
| Election Sept 2013 | 28/30 Mar 2014 | 30 Apr/1 May 2014 | |
| Coalition | 45.5% | 43% | 39% |
| Labor Party | 33.4% | 37% | 37% |
| The Greens | 8.7% | 10% | 11% |
| Palmer United Party | 5.5% | 4% | 6% |
| Another party or independent | 6.9% | 6% | 7% |
9% uncommitted or refused excluded
If a federal election for the house of representatives was held today, which one of the following would you vote for?
Two party preferred
| Election Sept 2013 | 28/30 Mar 2014 | 30 Apr/1 May 2014 | |
| Coaltion | 53.5% | 50% | 48% |
| Labor Party | 46.5% | 50% | 52% |
Deficit levy
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Coalition | |
| Yes | 72% | 90% | 52% |
| No | 21% | 6% | 41% |
| Uncommitted | 7% | 4% | 7% |
Thinking now about the federal Budget. One option to raise revenue would be a deficit levy. This would be a short-term tax on incomes above $80,000 a year. Given that Tony Abbott announced before the election that there would be no new taxes, if the Government was to introduce this deficit levy in the Budget would you consider this a broken promise?
Pension age
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Coalition | |
| In favour | 21% | 13% | 34% |
| Opposed | 69% | 81% | 57% |
| Uncommitted | 10% | 6% | 9% |
Are you in favour or opposed to lifting the pension age to 70 years?
Medicare co-payment
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Coalition | |
| In favour | 35% | 25% | 54% |
| Opposed | 55% | 67% | 36% |
| Uncommitted | 10% | 8% | 10% |
Are you in favour or opposed to a $6 co-payment for bulk-billed GP visits?
Paid parental leave
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Coalition | |
| Yes | 23% | 23% | 26% |
| No | 65% | 67% | 62% |
| Uncommitted | 12% | 10% | 12% |
In your opinion, should Tony Abbott proceed with the Paid Parental Leave scheme in the current budgetary environment?
These surveys were conducted by Galaxy Research. The most recent survey was administered by a combination of online and telephone interviews between 30 April and 1 May 2014. The results are based on the opinions of 1,391 voters. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the Australian population.
FEDERAL COALITION AND LABOR NECK AND NECK
Primary support for the Coalition has slipped since the election last year and they are now running neck and neck with Labor. If Joe Hockey hands down a tough Budget in May this would be likely to undermine support in the Coalition even further as the new government has been unable to convince voters of the need to curb spending on welfare.
Primary Vote
| Election Sept 2013 | 28/30 Mar 2014 | |
| Coalition | 45.5% | 43% |
| Labor Party | 33.4% | 37% |
| The Greens | 8.7% | 10% |
| Another party or independent | 12.4% | 10% |
7% uncommitted or refused excluded
If a federal election for the house of representatives was held today, which one of the following would you vote for?
Two party preferred
| Election Sept 2013 | 28/30 Mar 2014 | |
| Coaltion | 53.5% | 50% |
| Labor Party | 46.5% | 50% |
Accept cuts to welfare
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Coalition | |
| Yes | 34% | 18% | 56% |
| No | 56% | 73% | 34% |
| Uncommitted | 10% | 9% | 10% |
The federal Budget will be handed down in May by Joe Hockey. It is likely that this will include cuts to government spending. Do you accept that this should include cuts to the amount the government spends on welfare?
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on the weekend of 28-30 March 2014. The results are based on the opinions of 998 voters. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the Australian population.
VOTERS WANT INDEPENDENTS TO SUPPORT MARSHALL
The majority of voters in the seats of Fisher and Frome would like their independent local members to support Steven Marshall in order to permit the Liberals to form a minority government. The voters believe the Independents should look beyond their local electorate and base their decision on the interests of all South Australians.
Party Independents should support
| Total | Fisher | Frome | |
| Labor Party | 31% | 27% | 35% |
| Liberal Party | 60% | 66% | 53% |
| Uncommitted | 9% | 7% | 12% |
In your opinion, which party should (Geoff Brock/ Bob Such) support to permit them to form government?
Basis of decision
| Total | Fisher | Frome | |
| Best deal for his electorate | 29% | 22% | 37% |
| Best outcome for SA | 61% | 70% | 52% |
| Uncommitted | 10% | 8% | 11% |
In your opinion, should (Geoff Brock/ Bob Such) make the decision about which party to side with on the basis of securing the best deal for his electorate or ensuring the best outcome for South Australia?
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 17 March 2014 and is based on the opinions of 382 voters in the electorate of Fisher and 317 voters in the electorate of Frome. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of each electorate.
HANNA TO DETERMINE OUTCOME IN MITCHELL
The preferences of the Independent candidate, Kris Hanna, will determine the outcome in the seat of Mitchell. Neither the sitting member, Alan Sibbons, nor the Liberal candidate, Corey Wingard, will secure the primary vote required to win the seat and so both will be reliant on preferences. With Kris Hanna attracting the lion’s share of the minor party votes his preferences will be pivotal to the outcome.
Primary Vote
| Election Mar 2010 | 12 Mar 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 34.2% | 38% |
| Liberal Party | 28.5% | 36% |
| Kris Hanna | 27.8% | 19% |
| The Greens | 5.1% | 4% |
| Family First | 4.3% | 3% |
3% uncommitted or refused excluded
Two party preferred
| Election Mar 2010 | 12 Mar 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 52.4% | 51% |
| Liberal Party | 47.6% | 49% |
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 12 March 2014 and is based on the opinions of 586 voters in the electorate of Mitchell. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of the electorate.
NEWLAND IN THE BALANCE
On the eve of the state election the seat of Newland is hanging in the balance. With neither the sitting Labor member, Tom Kenyon, nor the Liberal candidate likely to secure the primary vote required to secure the seat, both will be reliant on the preferences of the minor parties.
Primary Vote
| Election Mar 2010 | 12 Mar 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 43.2% | 44% |
| Liberal Party | 38.1% | 42% |
| The Greens | 8.0% | 6% |
| Family First | 6.9% | 8% |
| Other | 3.8% | – |
6% uncommitted or refused excluded
Two party preferred
| Election Mar 2010 | 12 Mar 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 52.6% | 51% |
| Liberal Party | 47.4% | 49% |
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 12 March 2014 and is based on the opinions of 503 voters in the electorate of Newland. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of the electorate.
SANDERSON SAFELY HOLDING ADELAIDE
Rachel Sanderson, who achieved a shock 14.5% swing in the 2010 election to win the seat of Adelaide, looks set to be returned at the state election on 15 March. Voters in the seat have generally been satisfied with her performance over the last four years and this has reduced the likelihood of Labor regaining the seat.
Primary Vote
| Election Mar 2010 | 4 Mar 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 33.3% | 39% |
| Liberal Party | 44.5% | 49% |
| The Greens | 11.7% | 8% |
| Dignity for Disability | 1.9% | 4% |
| Other | 8.6% | – |
4% uncommitted or refused excluded
Two party preferred
| Election Mar 2010 | 4 Mar 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 45.8% | 46% |
| Liberal Party | 54.2% | 54% |
Satisfaction with Rachel Sanderson
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Liberal | |
| Satisfied | 51% | 19% | 80% |
| Dissatisfied | 26% | 53% | 5% |
| Uncommitted | 23% | 28% | 15% |
Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Rachel Sanderson has represented Adelaide as your member of parliament?
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 4 March 2014 and is based on the opinions of 587 voters in the electorate of Adelaide. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of the electorate.
VICTORIA IN THE BALANCE
With an election due later in the year the state of Victoria is evenly poised. While Denis Napthine is seen as a better choice of Premier than Daniel Andrews, the Labor Party hold a narrow lead on a two party preferred basis.
Primary Vote
| Election Nov 2010 | 26/27 Feb 2014 | |
| The Liberal Party | 38.0% | 37% |
| The Nationals | 6.8% | 5% |
| Total Coalition | 44.8% | 42% |
| Labor Party | 36.2% | 39% |
| The Greens | 11.2% | 12% |
| Another party or an independent candidate | 7.8% | 7% |
6% uncommitted or refused excluded
Two party preferred
| Election Nov 2010 | 26/27 Feb 2014 | |
| Coalition | 51.6% | 49% |
| Labor | 48.4% | 51% |
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on the evenings of 26-27 February 2014. The results are based on the opinions of 1,068 voters. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the Victorian population.
COLTON ON A KNIFE EDGE
With less than two weeks to polling day, the metropolitan seat of Colton is in the balance. Despite the strong level of satisfaction for current Labor member Paul Caica he must withstand a swing to the Liberals if he is to retain the seat.
Primary Vote
| Election Mar 2010 | 27 Feb 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 46.3% | 45% |
| Liberal Party | 39.9% | 46% |
| The Greens | 8.2% | 5% |
| Family First | 3.5% | 4% |
| Other | 2.1% | – |
5% uncommitted or refused excluded
Two party preferred
| Election Mar 2010 | 27 Feb 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 53.6% | 50% |
| Liberal Party | 46.4% | 50% |
Satisfaction with Paul Caica
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Liberal | |
| Satisfied | 58% | 89% | 33% |
| Dissatisfied | 22% | 5% | 41% |
| Uncommitted | 20% | 6% | 26% |
Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Paul Caica has represented Colton as your member of parliament?
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 27 February 2014 and is based on the opinions of 495 voters in the electorate of Colton. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of the electorate.
COLTON ON A KNIFE EDGE
With less than two weeks to polling day, the metropolitan seat of Colton is in the balance. Despite the strong level of satisfaction for current Labor member Paul Caica he must withstand a swing to the Liberals if he is to retain the seat.
Primary Vote
| Election Mar 2010 | 27 Feb 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 46.3% | 45% |
| Liberal Party | 39.9% | 46% |
| The Greens | 8.2% | 5% |
| Family First | 3.5% | 4% |
| Other | 2.1% | – |
5% uncommitted or refused excluded
Two party preferred
| Election Mar 2010 | 27 Feb 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 53.6% | 50% |
| Liberal Party | 46.4% | 50% |
Satisfaction with Paul Caica
| Supporters | |||
| Total | Labor | Liberal | |
| Satisfied | 58% | 89% | 33% |
| Dissatisfied | 22% | 5% | 41% |
| Uncommitted | 20% | 6% | 26% |
Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Paul Caica has represented Colton as your member of parliament?
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 27 February 2014 and is based on the opinions of 495 voters in the electorate of Colton. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of the electorate.
NEWMAN LOSING SUPPORT IN ASHGROVE
The Queensland Premier, Campbell Newman, is losing the goodwill of the voters and he would be likely to lose his seat of Ashgrove if an election was held now. Many voters are dissatisfied with his performance and the decision to take on the motorcycle gangs is costing the Premier votes.
Primary Vote
| Election Mar 2012 | 6 Feb 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 36.6% | 43% |
| LNP | 51.8% | 41% |
| The Greens | 9.2% | 7% |
| Palmer United Party | -% | 3% |
| Katter Australian Party | 1.7% | 1% |
| Other | 0.7% | 5% |
4% uncommitted or refused excluded
If a state election for Queensland was held today, which one of the following would you vote for?
Two party preferred
| Election Mar 2012 | 6 Feb 2014 | |
| Labor Party | 44.3% | 53% |
| LNP | 55.7% | 47% |
This survey was conducted by Galaxy Research on 6 February 2014. The results are based on the opinions of 503 voters in Ashgrove. The data has been weighted and projected to reflect the population of the Ashgrove electorate.
Tony Abbott has made it clear that the first legislative act of his government after September 14 will be to introduce legislation to repeal the carbon tax. The mining tax is also up for repeal.
The obstacle in Abbott’s path is the composition of the Senate. Until July 1 next year, the balance of power in the Senate remains with the Australian Greens. Without the support of their 9 senators, neither the ALP (31 senators) nor the coalition (34 senators) can command the 39 votes needed to win a vote.
Abbott and his shadow ministers have made it clear that they are prepared to call a double dissolution election if the Senate rejects their legislation. This can take place if the requirements of Section 57 of the Constitution are met.
Put simply, Section 57 says both houses of the parliament can be dissolved if a bill has been twice rejected by the Senate with an interval of three months between each rejection. In other words, House passes bill, Senate rejects Bill, 3 months elapse, House passes bill again, Senate rejects Bill again.
There have been 6 double dissolutions since Federation, the last in 1987 under the Hawke government.
In theory, it is possible that the requirements of Section 57 could be met before July 1, 2014. Assuming the new government calls Parliament together by the end of October, it could have the legislation in the Senate by November. It could quite easily be rejected before Christmas. The legislation could then be reintroduced in late March and be rejected a second time by the Senate before July 1.
There are practical reasons why this probably won’t take place but let’s leave that for a moment. A double rejection of a bill to repeal the carbon tax is quite feasible in the first half of next year.
What has been niggling at me recently is the view that a double dissolution cannot take place before July 1 next year. The proponents of this argument say that until the new senators who will be chosen on September 14 are sworn in on July 1, a dissolution of the parliament cannot take place because it would terminate the terms of office of senators before they even take their seats.
It is further argued that the first rejection of a double dissolution bill must also await the swearing-in of new senators.
As far as I can tell, the argument was first put by the ABC’s Antony Green in a June 30, 2011 article, What Chance a Double Dissolution In The Next Three Years?
In that article, Green said:
“While it is not explicit in the Constitution, I believe it is implicit in the fixed terms of the Senate that a double dissolution trigger can only apply to legislation first blocked by a Senate in place after 1 July 2014. The Constitution states the Senators take their place on the 1 July after their election. Any double dissolution triggers attempted before new Senators take their seats would not allow the new Senators to vote on the legislation.
“An attempt to create a double dissolution trigger before the new Senators took their seats would attempt to terminate the terms of 108 Senators rather than the 72 implied by the Constitution.”
Green elaborated on his theory in an interview with Lyndal Curtis on News24’s Capital Hill program yesterday.
- Listen to the relevant part of the interview (4m)
Green argued that a legal challenge to a double dissolution caused by the “old Senate” would hinge on the interpretation of Section 13 of the Constitution, which he claimed says that senators “will” or “shall” take their seats on July 1 after their election.
Section 13 does stipulate that senators take their seats on July 1. Most importantly, it also stipulates that “the election to fill vacant places shall be made within one year before the places are to become vacant”. But this is a long way from implying that a double dissolution trigger must await the arrival of new senators. I would argue the length of senators’ terms and the fact that Section 13 prescribes fixed dates implies something quite different.
Since the 72 senators from the states serve 6-year terms on a rotating basis, whereby 36 of them are chosen every 3 years, the Constitution refers to two “classes” of senators. At present, the first class was elected in 2007 and the second class was elected in 2010. It is the 2007 intake whose positions are up for grabs on September 14.
There are, of course, 76 senators in total. The remaining 4 are elected in the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. They serve a term that is concurrent with the House of Representatives, a maximum of three years.
In outlining the procedure by which the two classes of senators shall take their seats, Section 13 of the Constitution specifically says “the places of senators shall be vacant at the expiration of six years from the beginning of their term of service”.
To me, this does not imply an inability of the Senate to create a double dissolution trigger in the months leading up to the newly-chosen senators taking their seats. Rather, it implies that the senators are entitled to serve out their terms and exercise their constitutional powers during that time. Afterall, what is the point of a fixed term if the final months bring a diminution of power?
It follows that the government of the day is able to exercise its right to invoke Section 57 of the Constitution if its legislation is obstructed in the Senate.
Far from implying that a double dissolution election would terminate the terms of 108 senators (ie the existing 72 senators from the states plus the 36 chosen at the election), Section 13 makes it clear that there is no role for the senators chosen at the election until they take their seats on July 1.
Constitutionally, the Senators elected in September this year are irrelevant until July 1. Constitutionally, they do not exist until July 1. Just because they are waiting in the wings to be sworn in on July 1 is no impediment to the existing Senate acting as it sees fit. It follows that if the Senate can continue to act according to the Constitution, so should the government be able to activate Section 57.
What do fixed Senate terms imply? My argument is that the fixed terms of the Senate, combined with its rotating membership actually implies that the Senate is an ongoing body. At any moment it is what it is. As someone said to me recently, it is “in situ”. It should not be seen as a chamber which cannot fulfill its constitutional role because it is waiting upon new members to take their places. Equally, the executive’s right to invoke Section 57 cannot be limited on the grounds that the incoming senators haven’t voted on the legislation.
The current Senate is properly elected. It contains one class of senators who will be replaced on July 1. It contains 4 territory senators who will be replaced on September 14. Many of these “new” senators will be the same people who win re-election, but that is neither here nor there constitutionally.
The language we use is important here. There is no such thing as an “old Senate” and a “new Senate”. Rather, Section 13 implies that the Senate is an ongoing body, composed of a rotating membership of state senators with 6-year terms and territory senators serving concurrent terms with the House of Representatives. In addition, some senators (eg. Bob Carr) have been appointed by state parliaments to fill casual vacancies, as allowed for under Section 15.
It is surely absurd to suggest that a double dissolution is unconstitutional in the period prior to the swearing-in of new senators. To suggest this is to negate both the Senate’s and the executive’s power every three years following the election of new senators.
Thirty-two of the forty-three general elections since 1901 have been held in the second half of the year, including the last five elections in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010. Only one of these elections – 2004 – delivered a Senate majority to the government of the day, so this is a very real and practical issue that goes to the heart of the process of governing.
It may be argued that the Senate can still exercise its power to reject legislation in the period up until July 1 but cannot create a double dissolution trigger. This strikes me as a strange constitutional contradiction, one which may be at odds with Section 53’s “equal power” clause. This explicitly states that the House and Senate have equal powers in respect of all legislation, with the exception of money bills and some restrictions on bills imposing taxation.
Moreover, striking out the government’s power to call a double dissolution serves to deny the executive government the means of resolving a dispute with the Senate. For nearly a year, it denies the executive the right to invoke its power under Section 57 to dissolve the parliament and remit the legislation to the people for their decision.
In fact, if one accepts the argument that the double dissolution trigger can only be created after July 1, it effectively denies the executive the right to invoke Section 57 for up to 18 months. The actual wording of Section 57 only denies this right to the government in the final six months of its term: “But such dissolution shall not take place within six months before the date of the expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time.”
A theory that has the potential to restrict a double dissolution to a window of about a year during the government’s three-year term does not seem to be in accord with what is stated and implied by Section 57. In fact, Section 57 is largely neutered by the 108 senators argument.
The Senate is an ongoing chamber with a rotating membership. Aside from double dissolutions, it is never dissolved. Following a double dissolution, its members have their terms backdated to July 1 prior to the election. The Senate continues to exist, even when the House has been dissolved.
Furthermore, the Senate was conceived as a chamber with a membership that serves a term twice that of the House. Standard political theory holds that this satisfied the desire of our constitution’s “founding fathers” for an upper house to represent the States and act as a house of review. As in the US, the Senate was to be a bulwark against the excesses of the popularly elected lower house. Longer terms for senators and equality of representation for the States clearly supports this view.
But the writers of our Constitution also saw a government’s authority as deriving from the House of Representatives – “the people’s House”. They wanted both a Westminster parliamentary system and an upper house with real power. Accordingly, they conceived of a means of resolving conflicts between the two chambers.
Section 57 thus allows a government in the lower house to take the upper house to an election, if the conditions outlined earlier are satisfied. It places no restriction on the government calling a double dissolution election in the first year of its 3-year term. Furthermore, the joint sitting option seems designed to allow the government’s greater House numbers to ultimately prevail over the Senate, particularly once the electorate has been consulted. The Whitlam government’s 1974 joint sitting is a clear example of this idea at work.
Yet the theory of 108 senators effectively suspends Section 57 for up to a year following a half-Senate election in the second half of any year. It seems to reject the notion that a properly-constituted Senate is already in place. It denies the prime minister of the day the power to deal with Senate obstruction until after July 1.
All this strikes me as absurd and a travesty of the Constitution. It dilutes the power of the Senate for up to a year whilst simultaneously hamstringing the government’s legislative program and denying it the constitutional trigger to resolve a dispute between the houses.
The logical corollary of my argument is that the first Senate rejection could take place prior to July 1 and the second rejection after July 1. The Constitution does not distinguish between senators chosen at different elections. It certainly doesn’t consider senators who haven’t even been sworn in yet. Provided the 76 people sitting as senators at any given time have been properly elected, the Constitution is satisfied.
It has been suggested that there is something wrong with a sequence of events which renders an election redundant.
It is an imperfect comparison but consider a by-election held for the House of Representatives. It is possible that a candidate may be elected who never gets to sit in parliament because it has been dissolved for a general election.
This happened to former Liberal minister Peter Reith in 1982-83. Despite winning the Flinders by-election on December 4, 1982, Reith never took up his seat in the House because it was dissolved on February 3 for an early election. Reith lost his bid for re-election and did not enter the Parliament until 1984.
In simple terms, that’s just bad luck. We should adopt the same attitude in the scenario I have been discussing here. It is the behaviour of sitting members that counts constitutionally, not the preferences of election candidates who are not yet entitled to take their seats.
Since the Australian Senate was an idea adopted from the United States, in rejection of a hereditary or appointed chamber, US practice is of some relevance here. Again, it is an imperfect comparison but instructive all the same.
The Australian political system is a hybrid Westminster model, grafted onto an American-style federal system with an elected Senate. It is often referred to as a “Washminster” system.
Both the US House and Senate serve fixed terms. Elections are set for the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November every two years. New members usually take their seats on January 3 the following year.
At no point following an election does either chamber stop fulfilling its constitutional functions. Legislation is debated. Appointments are confirmed or rejected. At no point is the President denied his constitutional right to approve or veto legislation, to make appointments, or issue executive orders. Even a defeated President has full executive power for over two months after being defeated. Earlier this year, the House and Senate voted on the “fiscal cliff” legislation even though newly-elected members were about to take their seats and what could have been a one-term presidency was drawing to a close.
In December 1998, the so-called “lame duck” House, containing members who retired or were defeated in the November elections, voted to impeach President Bill Clinton. No-one suggested that the impeachment debate be delayed until members chosen in November took their seats. They were elected but not sworn in, so they were constitutionally irrelevant.
[An historical curio of this period is the current New York Senator Charles Schumer. As a member of the House in 1998, he sat on the Judiciary Committee which recommended the Articles of Impeachment against Clinton. At the November elections, he was elected to the Senate. He went on to vote on the impeachment articles in the House before his term expired. He then took his place in the Senate and deliberated in Clinton’s trial. Schumer was the only member of Congress to have participated and voted – against – at every stage of the impeachment process in both houses.]
Firstly, the decision would be in the hands of the Governor-General. Any request for a double dissolution is tendered to the Governor-General by the Prime Minister.
On two occasions, there were question marks over the validity of a double dissolution. In 1983, Sir Ninian Stephen kept Malcolm Fraser waiting for several hours whilst he satisfied himself that the bills in question had been properly passed and rejected. Famously, by the time Fraser got his double dissolution election, the ALP had removed Bill Hayden and installed Bob Hawke as leader. In the end, it was a bad day for Fraser who lost an election he didn’t have to call for another 10 months.
In 1951, Robert Menzies sought a double dissolution based on the Senate’s failure to pass the Commonwealth Banking Bill. Governor-General Sir William McKell (a former Labor premier of NSW) granted the dissolution even though some argued the Senate was still considering the bill. They argued the Senate referred the bill to a Select Committee and had not yet ‘failed to pass’ it. McKell accepted Menzies’s advice that they had. Opposition Leader Chifley grumpily noted that “Billy McKell will please his bloody self”.
What might Governor-General Quentin Bryce do? Would she declare that a Section 57 double dissolution was unconstitutional because new senators were due to be sworn in July? Would she argue that Prime Minster Abbott had to wait for the “new Senate” before invoking Section 57? Would Abbott advise the Queen to sack Bryce?
It really is a preposterous idea, as preposterous as suggesting that Bryce should not exercise her powers because her replacement as Governor-General will by then be known and pending an official swearing-in.
Assume, though, that the Governor-General grants the double dissolution in the first half of next year. Are we to seriously contemplate a High Court challenge to stop the election?
Maybe. There is no other way of stopping it.
A challenge could be brought by one of the yet-to-be-sworn-in senators. Presumably, a successful election candidate would have the appropriate standing to be heard by the High Court.
I have no way of knowing how the court would react to such a challenge. Would it dare to stop an election being held? Hopefully, the court would speedily dispose of the challenge as lacking substance. But the very fact of the challenge would represent a serious and needless question mark against the stable operation of our political system.
It is most likely the scenarios I have considered above will never come to pass.
Firstly, a new government elected on September 14 might also win a Senate majority. If frustrated by the current Senate, it could simply wait until July and then legislate accordingly.
Secondly, the ALP might capitulate and allow passage of the Abbott government’s legislation.
Thirdly, the legislative time frame might work against the government’s ability to call a double dissolution in the first half of 2014.
Following the September 14 election, the next Parliament is likely to meet in late October at the earliest. Bills to repeal the carbon or mining taxes could be passed through the House in a matter of days. Passage through the Senate could take longer. The Senate, controlled by the ALP and the Greens, might send the legislation to a committee. They might hold public hearings. Passage or rejection of the bill could be delayed for some time. At what stage in November or December might the bill finally be voted on?
Section 57 then requires three months to elapse. This takes us into March and possibly April. The bill(s) have to be passed by the House again. They have to go before the Senate again. More delay is likely. The range of mechanisms available to the Senate could enable it to delay things until May or June.
So the question of a double dissolution might not even arise before July 1.
Fourthly, Tony Abbott may not want a double dissolution election before July because then the House and Senate terms would be thrown out of kilter because Senators elected in, say, April-May 2014 would have their terms backdated to July 1, 2013. See Section 13.
This would necessitate a half-Senate election sometime between July 2015 and June 2016. To get the elections back into alignment, Abbott would have to call an early House election in 2016, shaving a year off his 3-year term, or hold separate House and Senate elections in 2016 and 2017. That’s a lot of elections in a short space of time.
On the other hand, any double dissolution election creates a degree of scheduling difficulty. Abbott might be prepared to risk it in order to fulfil his election promise to repeal the carbon and mining taxes as soon as possible. The tantalising prospect of gaining a Senate majority at a double dissolution might entice him to chance his arm, whatever electoral dislocation it might create down the track.
This debate will probably be rendered irrelevant by the exigencies of time and practical politics. Nevertheless, important principles are at stake. They matter as much to an incoming Coalition government as they would to a Labor government at another time.
It should not be seen as a party-political issue but as one in which the powers of the parliament and the executive should be protected.
Most importantly, a distorted view of the Constitution should not be allowed to prevent a legislative deadlock being remitted to the people for decision.
Of course, the best solution to the argument would be a constitutional referendum to institute concurrent terms for the House and Senate. But that’s a different can of worms entirely.
If the House of representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously. But such dissolution shall not take place within six months before the date of the expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time.
If after such dissolution the House of Representatives again passes the proposed law, with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
The members present at the joint sitting may deliberate and shall vote together upon the proposed law as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and upon amendments, if any, which have been made therein by one House and not agreed to by the other, and any such amendments which are affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be taken to have been carried, and if the proposed law, with the amendments, if any, so carried is affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, it shall be taken to have been duly passed by Houses of the Parliament, and shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen’s assent.
When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen’s assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to this Constitution, that he assents in the Queen’s name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves the law for the Queen’s pleasure.
The Governor-General may return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the recommendation.
The Queen may disallow any law within one year from the Governor-General’s assent, and such disallowance on being made known by the Governor-General by speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul the law from the day when the disallowance is so made known.
A proposed law reserved for the Queen’s pleasure shall not have any force unless and until within two years from the day on which it was presented to the Governor-General for the Queen’s assent the Governor-General makes known, by speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, that it has received the Queen’s assent.
