In the coming months our new federal government will be promoting a massive expansion in Australia’s coal exports. In all likelihood they’ll hail it as “good For Australia”. It isn’t.

Most of us are familiar with the damage coal mining, export and burning does to the environment. We know it affects health, contributes to climate change, risks groundwater supplies and threatens the Great Barrier Reef.

For many, that damage is offset by what they see as social and economic benefits, here and abroad. But in almost all cases, those benefits are exaggerated or non-existent.

How much carbon dioxide are we exporting?

The Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics expects (p. 106) that Australia’s black coal exports in the financial year 2013-14 will be 350 million tonnes (Mt).

With an energy content factor of about 27 GJ/tCoal, and an emissions factor (including oxidation factor) for CO₂ of about 88.2 kgCO2-e/GJ, this gives 2.38 tonnes of CO₂-e (CO₂-equivalent) from every tonne of coal burnt.

The effects of methane and nitrous oxide released from coal combustion bump it up to 2.39 tCO₂-e. That implies that the combustion of our coal exports will release around 836 Mt CO₂-e. To put that figure in perspective, Germany’s CO₂emissions in 2011 were just 807 Mt.

Greenpeace estimates the mega-mines planned for Queensland’s Galilee Basin alone would produce some 705 million tonnes of CO₂ each year. That’s enough to chew through around 6% of the CO₂ the entire world can release to keep warming to 2C above pre-industrial temperatures.

Burning coal causes billions of dollars in damage

Our coal exports are causing massive environmental, social and economic damage. These costs are not factored into coal’s export price.

In May the US Government revised its estimates for the net present value of global damage caused by CO₂ emissions. These models may significantly under-estimate the costs of damage, but the results are sobering.

By these conservative US Government estimates, our current coal exports are causing between A$11 billion and A$103 billion of damage globally each year (in 2013 dollars). None of this is included in the coal export price.

When we consider that total revenues from exports in FY2013-14 (p. 94) are expected to be around A$41.5 billion, and actual profits are a much smaller fraction of revenues, we can be confident that the unpriced damage caused by our coal exports is likely to be significantly greater than the profits made from those exports.

If our coal exports were to reach 1000 Mt by 2020, they would be producing around 2390 Mt of CO₂ and up to A$370 billion in global damage each year.

Pricing this damage could fund the repair

It will be argued of course, that this reasoning doesn’t take into account the economic benefits from the energy produced from the coal. True. But the export price should be higher to internalise the costs of damage – otherwise markets will continue to give misleading signals.

Correcting the market failure of externalised costs could be done either in Australia with an export tax, or in the importing countries with an import tariff or domestic price on carbon.

If Australia imposed an export tax itself, as Peter Christoff suggested, then the Australian people would capture the benefits of that revenue stream. We could fund climate adaptation measures, clean energy and disaster risk reduction in Australia. We could pay our international climate finance obligations to the poorest developing countries to help them to adapt to climate change.

The coal boom damages our economy

Treasury officials and researchers such as Richard Denniss and Matt Grudnoff have shown the resources boom helped to push up our exchange rate.

This caused significant damage to tourism, tertiary education, manufacturing, agriculture and other clean export industries – a classic example of the so-called Dutch-disease. These industries employ vastly more people (Table 06) in far more widely dispersed locations than coal mining.

Leisure tourism has also been hard hit, not only by the higher exchange rate, but by higher labour costs and difficulties attracting skilled staff.

A massive expansion of coal mining would make capital and labour even more expensive for other industries – exacerbating the crowding out effects already seen in the first phase of the mining boom.

Australia Institute researcher Mark Ogge has said: “Consultants for Clive Palmer’s China First coal mine in the Galilee basin estimated, in the company’s EIS, that this effect of driving up labor costs would mean 3,000 jobs will be lost in other parts of the economy, with manufacturing being the hardest hit.”

Powerful coal interests distort our political system

Guy Pearse and Clive Hamilton blew the whistle on the influence the fossil fuel industry has on Australia’s climate change and energy policies. Powerful coal mining companies and their lobbyists distort our political economy, and the expansion of the industry will only make the problem worse.

The tourism and education sectors are together just as significant export earners for Australia, and employ far more people, than coal mining.

But there is no equivalent to the giant mining companies in those sectors to make large political donations, or to fund well-orchestrated lobbying and media campaigns promoting their interests.

Our coal undercuts clean energy in developing countries

The argument is often made that if we really cared about the poor we’d export a lot more coal – but this is purest nonsense. It ignores the devastating costs of climate change and respiratory illnesses to the poor, and makes it harder for developing countries to transition to a clean energy future.

Wind energy is already competitive with new coal-fired power stations in India and solar is expected to be competitive by 2018.

The World Bank no longer funds coal fired power stations in developing countries and analysts at Goldman Sachs are already warning that coal export terminals are a bad investment because expected global demand for thermal coal has been over-estimated.

Australia should halt its plans to expand its coal production and exports – it enriches a few at the expense of millions and will inflict immense damage both on our own country and on the rest of the world.

By Degrees

A Climate Alarm, Too Muted for Some

Human Hands in a Changing Climate: The Times’s Justin Gillis talks about what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will release in their report later this month.

By JUSTIN GILLIS

Published: September 9, 2013

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Articles in this series focus on the central arguments in the climate debate and examine the evidence for global warming and its consequences.

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Factories near Bangkok. A United Nations panel will release a new report on the science of climate change this month.

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Fishermen at Marunda beach in Jakarta, Indonesia. Rising sea level is one of the risks associated with burning fossil fuels and higher global temperatures.

In one case, we have a lot of mainstream science that says if human society keeps burning fossil fuels with abandon, considerable land ice could melt and the ocean could rise as much as three feet by the year 2100. We have some outlier science that says the problem could be quite a bit worse than that, with a maximum rise exceeding five feet.

The drafters of the report went with the lower numbers, choosing to treat the outlier science as not very credible.

In the second case, we have mainstream science that says if the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere doubles, which is well on its way to happening, the long-term rise in the temperature of the earth will be at least 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, but more likely above 5 degrees. We have outlier science that says the rise could come in well below 3 degrees.

In this case, the drafters of the report lowered the bottom end in a range of temperatures for how much the earth could warm, treating the outlier science as credible.

Climate change skeptics often disparage these periodic reports from the United Nations, claiming that the panel writing them routinely stretches the boundaries of scientific evidence to make the problem look as dire as possible. So it is interesting to see that in these two important cases, the panel seems to be bending over backward to be scientifically conservative.

Is it right to throw out bleeding-edge science in the one case while keeping it in the other? That is hard to judge for anybody who is not a working climate scientist. After all, we pay them for their expertise, just as we pay doctors to advise us if we are diagnosed with cancer. And we are talking about two distinct issues here, each with its own specialized body of research.

The group making these decisions is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a worldwide committee of several hundred scientists knowledgeable in the complex field of climatology. It won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, along with Al Gore, for helping to alert the public to the risks that are being run with the unchecked combustion of fossil fuels.

The group’s decisions will not be final until the official report is released on Sept. 27. We know about them only because a secret draft was leaked ahead of the final editing session coming up in Stockholm. Scientists from a few countries have raised objections to the preliminary decisions on sea level and temperature, and they could well change in the final report.

Perhaps they should; there are climate scientists not serving on the committee this year who think so. Their fear is that the intergovernmental panel might be pulling punches.

It turns out that the Nobel Prize, welcome as it might have been back in 2007, served the same function it has for many other scientists who have won it over the years: it painted a fat target on the committee’s back. The group has been subjected to attack in recent years by climate skeptics. The intimidation tactics have included abusive language on blogs, comparisons to the Unabomber, e-mail hacking and even occasional death threats.

Who could blame the panel if it wound up erring on the side of scientific conservatism? Yet most citizens surely want something else from the group: an unvarnished analysis of the risks they face.

To be clear, even if the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ends up sticking with the lowball numbers in these two instances, they are worrisome enough. As best scientists can tell, the question with sea level is not whether it is going to get to three feet and then five feet of increase, but merely whether it will happen in this century or the next.

Likewise, with temperature, the panel is saying only that the lowball numbers are possible, not that they are likely. In fact, the metric used in the scientific literature, the temperature effect of doubled carbon dioxide, is merely a convenient way of comparing studies. Many people make the mistake of thinking that is how much of a global temperature increase will actually occur.

At the pace we are going, there is no reason to think that we will stop burning fossil fuels when carbon dioxide doubles. We could be on our way to tripling or quadrupling the amount of that heat-trapping gas in the atmosphere. In that case, experts believe, even an earth that turns out to be somewhat insensitive to carbon dioxide will undergo drastic changes.

Obviously, the high estimates are even scarier. So it would be nice to hear an explanation from the drafters of this coming report as to why they made decisions that effectively play up the low-end possibilities. But with the report still officially under wraps, they are not speaking publicly. We are thus left wondering whether it is a matter of pure professional judgment — or whether they have been cowed by the attacks of recent years.

Assuming these decisions withstand final review, it will be fascinating to hear the detailed

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Before the election, Tony Abbott ruled out negotiating with independents or minor parties if he didn’t achieve a majority in the lower House. But the pain Gillard experienced in bargaining for the votes of three independents in the House of Representatives is likely to be magnified for Abbott in getting six or more votes from a motley crew of micro-parties in the Senate. Is there another path? Abbott previously threatened to call a double dissolution if his legislation was blocked in the Senate. How feasible and likely is this?

The composition of the Senate

While the House of Representatives is dissolved at every general election, the Senate is a continuing House with fixed terms. Apart from the four Territory Senators, whose terms are tied to the House of Representatives, the Senators elected by each State have a term of six years with half being elected every three years. The Senate itself is not ordinarily dissolved – it just keeps operating with a change to its membership.

The candidates who were elected to the Senate at the 7 September 2013 election (except for the Territory Senators), will therefore not take up their seats until after the terms of half the current Senators run out on 30 June 2014. That means that the Abbott Government will confront a Senate where the Greens hold the balance of power until 30 June 2014, followed by a Senate where micro parties hold the balance of power for the next three years.

Double dissolution

The only exception is if a double dissolution is held. This means that both the Senate and the House of Representatives are dissolved. The consequence is that all the Senate seats become vacant and are immediately filled in the election. Twelve Senators are elected for each State, rather than six. The Senate then divides the Senators into two groups – those who get a six year term (who are usually those with the highest vote, but this is determined by a resolution of the new Senate) and those who get a three year term. The old Senate is terminated and replaced by a newly elected and constituted Senate.

Double dissolutions are relatively rare. They have taken place in 1914, 1951, 1974, 1975, 1983 and 1987. There is a special constitutional procedure that must be met before a double dissolution can be held. A Bill (or Bills) must be initiated in the House of Representatives and then blocked in the Senate (either by being rejected, failing to pass or passing with amendments that the House will not accept). A period of three months must then pass. Then the House must pass it again and the Senate block it. Only once the Government has such a trigger can a Prime Minister advise the Governor-General to grant a double dissolution. Double dissolution triggers may be ‘stock-piled’, but a double dissolution cannot be held in the six months before the House of Representatives expires.

There is also an issue about the extent to which the Governor-General has a discretion in granting a double dissolution. On previous occasions, such as 1914 and 1951, the view was taken by the Governor-General that he did have a discretion. In 1914 the Governor-General sought advice from the Chief Justice of the High Court on the extent of his powers to help him decide. In 1951, Labor Members of Parliament argued that the Governor-General should take advice from the Chief Justice, Sir John Latham, although it appears that he made his decision without such advice. Certainly in 1983, the Governor-General, Sir Ninian Stephen did not regard the Prime Minister’s advice as sufficient and sent him back to provide further advice about the importance of the blocked bills and the workability of Parliament. He stated in his letter to Prime Minister Fraser on 8 February 1983:

Such precedents as exist, together with the writings on section 57 of the Constitution, suggest that in circumstances such as the present, I should, in considering your advice, pay regard to the importance of the measures in question and to the workability of Parliament.

It might prove difficult to characterise the Parliament as unworkable if there had only been one rejection of a Bill and the Parliament had only been in operation a short time. It could prove even more difficult if the composition of the Senate was about to change.

Could a double dissolution be held before the Senate’s composition changes on 1 July?

Holding a double dissolution before 1 July faces two potential hurdles. First, there is a timing problem. The Senate is perfectly entitled to scrutinise bills, including sending them off to committees for public hearings and the receipt of expert advice. Once this is combined with the three month delay between bills, the process can become quite drawn out.

The Government would run a great risk in simply categorising a bill as having ‘failed to pass’ the Senate, just because the Senate took time to scrutinise it. The Whitlam Government tried this in 1974 but the High Court later held that one of its bills was not a valid double dissolution trigger because the Senate had not been given adequate time to scrutinise it. Fortunately for Whitlam, he had plenty of other triggers to rely upon. If an Abbott Government was relying on a single double dissolution trigger, it would have to be very careful indeed.

Secondly, there is a constitutional question as to whether a double dissolution could be held before the 1 July changeover, given that new Senators have already been elected. It could be argued that a double dissolution is intended to resolve a deadlock between the Houses, but once the Senate’s composition changes on 1 July, such a deadlock might no longer exist. The Governor-General might contend that to decide upon the workability of Parliament, she would need advice from the Prime Minister on the workability of Parliament under the changed composition of the Senate after 1 July 2014. Further, people who had been elected as Senators, to commence office on 1 July 2014, might contend that their election could not be wiped out in this manner.

On the other hand, it could be argued that while s 57 of the Constitution expressly prevents the holding of a double dissolution in the last six months before the House of Representatives expires, it does not expressly prevent the holding of a double dissolution immediately before the Senate’s composition is changed on 1 July. It could also be argued that the candidates elected in the half-Senate election in September 2013 were elected to fill future vacancies in a continuing House. However, a double dissolution would completely dissolve that House, rendering their election of no effect. The Senate to which they had been elected would no longer exist and they would therefore have no entitlement to take up that office on 1 July 2014.

Timing problems

A double dissolution held before 1 July 2014 would also give rise to timing problems in relation to subsequent elections. Section 13 of the Constitution provides that after a double dissolution, the terms of Senators are dated back to the previous 1 July (i.e. 1 July 2013). The consequence would be that the next half-Senate election would have to be held some time in the 12 months before 30 June 2016. Assuming that an Abbott Government won a further term in office at a double dissolution held in, say, April 2014, it would need to go to the polls again in two years, if it were to hold the next half-Senate election with a general election. Alternatively, it would have to face a separate half-Senate election after being in office for two years, which like a by-election would probably result in some anti-government expressions of voter discontent. Neither outcome is terribly good for a Coalition Government.

Would a double dissolution improve the Coalition’s position in the Senate?

The main reason why it is unlikely that a double dissolution would be held is that it would be likely to make it even harder for the Coalition to negotiate bills through the Senate. Because 12 Senators would be elected in a State, rather than six, the quota for winning a seat would be lower. This makes it much easier for micro parties and independents to win seats. It is also more difficult for a major party to win six out of twelve Senate seats in a State than it is to win three out of six. Given the high vote for micro parties at this half-Senate election, the likely outcome of a double dissolution in the next 6 months would be to increase the number of cross-benchers holding the balance of power in the Senate, which would not be likely to be to the Coalition’s benefit.

The only likelihood of a double dissolution would be if the major parties got together and agreed to change the electoral laws in such a way as to limit the ability of micro parties to be elected to the Senate. This could be done by increasing the threshold quota for election, increasing the deposit paid by candidates and increasing requirements for party membership before a party can get on the ballot. They might also consider the approach that NSW took after the infamous ‘table-cloth ballot paper’ of 1999, which was to move to optional preferential above-the-line voting, so that voters can still vote above the line but can control their preference flows, rather than having the gaming of upper house seats by micro parties.

Finally, there is the issue of sending voters back to the polls so soon after an election. There is likely to be a backlash from the public if they feel that they are being forced to put up with another long election campaign simply because the government feels that they got it wrong. Many will have deliberately voted against the Coalition in the Senate because they didn’t support many of their policies and wanted the Coalition to be forced to negotiate and compromise. They might be none too thrilled to be told to go back and vote again.

[This blog-post is an extended version of an opinion piece published in The Australian on 11 September 2013.]

SUGGESTED CITATION: Anne Twomey, ‘From Simple Disillusion to Double Dissolution’ Constitutional Critique, 12 September 2013, (Constitutional Reform Unit Blog, University of Sydney,

For at least the past one or two decades the adjective extreme has increasingly become used in describing unusual weather. It’s virtually impossible now to escape news of extreme drought, excessive rainfall and floods, record breaking heat waves, cool spells and severe weather outbreaks, etc. which seem to recur year after year around the Northern Hemisphere. This summer was no different except that the behavior and configuration of the polar jet stream, the river of high altitude winds marking the divide between warm and cool air, were rare and mind-boggling.

Instead of meandering as a single stream like it normally does, it transformed into a “dual” jet stream configuration, sometimes transitioning from this dual setup back into a single more coherent stream, back and forth.

The rarity of dual polar jets was highlighted by Professor John Nielsen-Gammon (Texas A&M University) in an article in Popular Mechanics. He pointed out they are something one might see once per decade. From an independent assessment myself, it appears that there are no other polar jet examples comparable to this summer at least as far back as 2000 (the furthest back I’ve looked).

Mostly, the perplexing behavior of the polar jet has been described in befuddling terminology such as weird, mangled, and wobbly. Some have described the jet in a state of disarray, not playing by the so-called rules. Jeff Masters said that in his 30 years doing meteorology, the jet stream has been doing things he’s not seen before.

What follows is a rather technical discussion of how this jet stream pattern evolved and some of the weather characteristics associated with it. Although some terms may not be familiar, the included parenthetical notes and illustrations should help guide you along.

As a general overview I’ve subjectively identified three periods I call Regime 1, 2, and 3. To illustrate associated weather characteristics, I present 500mb zonal wind (representative of upper level jet stream) anomalies and 850mb temperature (low-level temperature) regimes over the June-July-August (JJA) meteorological summer. In these time vs. latitude (30-90N) charts, color coded values are daily means longitudinally averaged (0-360 degrees) at each latitude. Jet streams coincide with the green to red colorization. The three regimes are separated by notably shorter periods of transition from one regime to the next.

Regime 1 (R1) appeared following a regime change at the end of May (not shown) to a dual polar jet which persisted through most of June. Around the beginning of July, R1 transitioned to a single jet mode which characterized Regime 2 (R2). During the third week in July, there was a rapid change to another dual jet configuration in Regime 3 (R3), which subsequently transitioned to a single jet during the middle of August.

Time evolution of daily means vs. latitude of longitudinally averaged (0-360 longitude)  500mb zonal wind anomalies (left) and 850mb temperature (right). Green to red correspond to jets; light yellow to red identify correspond to anomalous warmth.

It’s important to add that changes in the zonal wind at any given latitude conform directly (via basic meteorological principles, “thermal wind”) to the largest north-south and south-north differences (gradient) in the lower level temperature field (winds adjust to temperature changes, not vica versa, except in the Tropics).

Most significantly, each regime reflects notably different background fields in the three dimensional wind and temperature structure of the atmosphere from the mid-latitudes to the North Pole (NP). Although there is considerable variability within a given regime, each appears to have predominant signatures in observed weather events that differ from those characterizing the other regimes. Some examples appear deeper down.

To further describe aspects of regime transition, I’ll focus on that from R2 to R3. See first the time/lat chart for the period July 1 to Aug 9.

The major difference between R2 and R3 zonal wind anomalies is obvious. Specifically, R2 is characterized by a single maximum in zonal wind speed (single polar jet) centered between 55-65N. Following a relatively short period of transition, two maxima (dual jets) are evident (in R3), the strongest immediately surrounding the NP (80-90N) while the second is seen initially far to the south but migrating slowly towards mid-latitudes.

The zonal wind profiles are directly tied to evolution of the lower level temperature field. R2 is characterized by very warm weather immediately surrounding the NP (80-90N), cool in the 60-75N latitudinal band, and warm centered between 45-55N.

After the relatively short transition period, R3 is virtually a mirror image with very cold around NP, warmth between 65-75N, and cool further south. Close inspection, if you are so inclined (presuming you have very good eyesight), will reveal that zonal wind speed maxima occur precisely where temperature decreases most rapidly from S-N, while minima are found where temperature increases most rapidly from N-S.

So what does all this have to do with extreme weather events?

Almost invariably extreme summer weather of late is discussed in context of anomalies (differences from average) in the polar jet. The anomalies are commonly attributed directly or indirectly to global warming (aka climate change) as manifest in warming occurring faster in the Arctic than latitudes further south (Arctic amplification). Temperatures, therefore, decrease less rapidly than the climatological norm, and the zonal component of the winds at jet levels adjust by weakening relative to “normal”. The response generally speaking is for atmospheric waves to amplify in their meridional (N-S) extent and lead to more frequent occurrences of unusually high amplitude ridges (and/or blocking highs) and troughs (and/or cut-off lows) along with the respective weather associated with these systems. In combination with slowing progression of weather systems, this translates to enhancing prospects for persistent spells of extreme heat, and extended periods of unusually cool and/or wet conditions.

As illustrated in the figures above, the N-S differential heating adjustments in the zonal wind component are considerably more complex with regard to details in the spatial and temporal variability within as well as between regimes. In particular, note variability in details over time and latitude in the blue areas where zonal winds are least strong and thus favorable for high amplitude circulations and possible extreme weather.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, it is possible to discern the principle unique expression of each regime. By way of example, this figure displays those for R2 and R3.

The distinct differences between the two regimes are abundantly clear (the 500mb height anomalies are closely related to the low level temperatures.) Note especially the dramatic transition from relatively cool conditions to extreme warmth over Alaska (influence of high amplitude ridge), the cooling trough in R3 over the Northeast U.S., and dominantly warm (R2) to dominantly cool (R3) over extreme northern Europe.

The figures below exemplify regional differences corresponding to heavy rainfall events (precipitable water – total atmospheric water content above location – is used as an approximation for relative differences in precipitation).

The transition form R2 to R3 brings in flooding rains to Western Europe.

Especially interesting for the U.S.  are alternating regions of dominantly dry and dominantly wet conditions in the sequence of regimes transitions over the course of the entire summer, shown below.

Finally, there is no basis at this time (if ever) to determine whether the transitions to and from regimes with dual polar jets made this summer any more or less unusual in occurrences of extreme weather events than over the past 10-15 years, which have been presumed to be less complicated by dual jets.

Scientists tend to believe the increase in extreme weather is tied somehow to the diminishing Arctic ice cover and perhaps more rapid melting of snow cover over Siberia. The “somehow”, especially when coupled to interactions with other plausible and not yet identified factors, remains an open question. No individual or set of observational studies to date and no existing models and modeling strategies are adequate for garnering some insights when dealing with details in regional domains. This is especially true when dual polar jets are added to the mix of complexities. As far as I know, there has not even been a single investigation of the why’s and wherefore’s of