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  • State of the Senate: crossbench boom

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    State of the Senate: crossbench boom

    There is a lot still up in the air in the Senate, but it is the more interesting element of the election at this point and is producing the most incredible results, with the likelihood of an increase in Greens numbers despite a national swing, the election of multiple Palmer United Party candidates, and the possible election of multiple micro-parties off tiny votes.

    Labor looks set to be reduced to one seat only in two states, something that has never happened before in even one, and looks likely to narrowly avoid the same in a third state.

    At the moment, it looks like what can broadly described as the minor right-wing parties are set to win a seat in every state, while the Greens will win seats in more states than 2007, although not as many as 2010.

    On current figures, the result will be:

    • Coalition – 33 (31-35)
    • Labor – 25
    • Greens – 10 (10-12)
    • Palmer United Party – 2 (1-3)
    • Xenophon – 1
    • Family First – 1
    • Australian Sports Party – 1 (0-1)
    • Australian Motoring Enthusiasts – 1 (0-1)
    • Democratic Labour Party – 1
    • Liberal Democratic Party – 1

    In the ACT and four out of six states, there is one seat which isn’t entirely decided. Two of these seats (ACT and NSW) are races where a Green is trailing a Liberal – not by an insurmountable margin but in both cases the Liberal is the favourite. In Western Australia and Victoria a party off a tiny vote (0.2% to 0.5%) wins a seat, but if they are excluded earlier in the count the race will be entirely different. In Tasmania, the Liberal Party and Palmer United Party are tied with the LDP just behind. If the LDP overtakes the Palmer candidate, Palmer’s preferences will elect the Liberal.

    The best case scenario for the Coalition sees them gaining only one Senate seat, with a risk of losing up to three. In the best-case scenario, the Abbott government will have a choice of four out of five right-wing minor party senators, as well as the option of Nick Xenophon and ten Greens senators.

    In the worst-case scenario, the Liberal Party will require all eight non-Greens crossbenchers, or twelve Greens senators, to pass legislation, and would probably struggle with a bloc of three Palmer United Party senators.

    Follow me below the fold for analysis of each individual race.

    Australian Capital Territory

    This race is simple – between Liberal Zed Seselja and Green Simon Sheikh. At the moment Seselja leads by 1.43% ahead of Sheikh at the final exclusion point. That gap could be closed by late counting and counting of below the line votes, but it could also widen. Antony Green’s ABC Senate calculator assumes that all votes follow above-the-line preference flows, which were favourable to Simon Sheikh.

    Interestingly, the preferences of the Animal Justice Party, which flowed to the Liberal over the Green, would have been enough to put Sheikh ahead if they flowed in the opposite direction.

    New South Wales

    In New South Wales, the ALP has retained two of their three seats, and lost a third. The Liberal/National coalition have definitely retained two of their seats.

    The Liberal Democratic Party, who had the first position on the giant ballot paper, polled a massive 8.9% primary vote and will elect a Senator. This will net the party somewhere in the vicinity of $800,000 in public funding. It’s worth emphasising that they haven’t won due to preference trickery, but due to a large primary vote. This is presumably strongly influence by their name’s similarity to the party winning yesterday’s election, and the donkey vote on the biggest ballot in Australian history.

    Northern Territory

    The ALP fell below a quota on primary votes in the NT, but will retain their seat. The closest rival is the Palmer United Party, but Greens preferences will protect Labor from this threat.

    Queensland

    The ALP has lost a seat in Queensland to the Palmer United Party, who have polled over 10% in the Senate in Queensland. Bob Katter’s Australian Party polled a dismal 2.76%, with the Greens knocked down to 6.22%.

    South Australia

    Like in 2007, Sarah Hanson-Young looks set to win off a relatively low vote thanks to preferences and thanks to Nick Xenophon taking a big chunk out of the Labor vote.

    The ALP was pushed to third on primary votes in South Australia, with the Liberal Party currently on 26.7%, Nick Xenophon on 25.9% and the ALP on 22.8%. Sarah Hanson-Young polled just over 7%, with Family First’s Bob Day on 3.8%.

    After the election of Penny Wong, the ALP’s second senator, Don Farrell, leads Hanson-Young by 1.41% on primary votes. The Greens narrow the gap on Democrats preferences then jump over the top of the ALP on Palmer preferences.

    Ultimately the ALP is knocked out and the Greens are elected on Labor preferences. Both Greens and Labor preferenced Family First ahead of Nick Xenophon, electing Bob Day over Nick Xenophon’s second candidate, with Simon Birmingham of the Liberal Party then defeating Nick Xenophon’s second candidate by 2.47%.

    Tasmania

    Two Labor, two Liberal and one Green are elected without too much trouble.

    At the key exclusion point, the third Liberal and the Palmer United and Liberal Democrat candidates all sit between 9% and 10%. If the LDP or the Liberal Party come third at this point, then Palmer’s candidate wins. If Palmer’s candidate comes third, the Liberal candidate wins.

    Victoria

    The Greens have safely gained a second Victorian Senate seat off the ALP – their only likely gain of the night. In addition to the ALP losing a seat, the current scenario has the third Liberal losing to the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts.

    The AME gets elected on the calculator off an obscenely small 0.52% of the primary vote. The AME don’t get any early preferences, but at the point where they are on 0.57% they gain preferences from the Fishing and Lifestyle Party, on 0.46%.

    If AME are excluded, then the Liberal Party’s Helen Kroger will likely be re-elected.

    Western Australia

    In Western Australia, the combined Labor-Greens vote has dropped sufficiently that one of them will definitely lose a seat. At the moment it seems close to certain this will be Labor’s Louise Pratt, so Labor and the Greens each win a single seat. The Liberals will retain their three seats.

    On the current count the sixth seat goes to the Australian Sports Party off only 0.22%.  At the key exclusion point, the ASP are on 0.31% and Rise Up Australia are on 0.29%, and Rise Up’s preferences pushes the Sports Party up and starts the snowball rolling.

    If the ASP gets excluded, then the Palmer United Party wins the final seat, and the Greens lose support with labor.

  • Labor is broken, the Coalition is hiding. But they are not the same

    Labor is broken, the Coalition is hiding. But they are not the same

    Australian voters face an uninspiring choice. We won’t try to tell you how to vote, but there is much at risk from an Abbott victory

    What a dispiriting election campaign it has been. Over five weeks, voters have been ignored, patronised and taken for granted. It’s always a mistake to say that “all politicians are the same” – they never are. But there can be few elections where the choice is as uninspiring as this.

    The opposition leader, Tony Abbott, and the Coalition have chosen to treat the democratic process with contempt, presumably because the polls, clearly pointing to their victory, make them believe they can. They have comprehensively evaded scrutiny, with no policy costings until 48 hours before the ballot. For months, there has been a blank space where their policies should be; candidates have been discouraged from speaking to the media and even from attending forums in their own communities; access has been denied to journalists who don’t toe the party line.

    The Coalition has been steadied by a new Tony Abbott whose ruthless focus is in contrast to his past reputation for ill-discipline. His paid parental leave scheme, which rewards the wealthiest most, is at least an attempt to rectify his poor record when it comes to women. But really the Coalition has been relying on the exhausted electorate’s distrust of Labor after their self-obsessed infighting, and the view that it’s time someone else had a go. But do those voting for Tony Abbott really prefer Christopher Pyne to Bill Shorten, Andrew Robb to Penny Wong, Peter Dutton to Tanya Plibersek? Are they really happy to lay waste to Australia’s unique environment, just because it feels like someone else’s turn? Are they not alarmed by hints at spending cuts that go as far as austerity, which has wreaked such devastation in Europe?

    Labor, meanwhile, has been in chaos, with unworkable policies apparently made up on the spot, from low tax zones in the north to an expressed “unease” about foreign investment in the land. Its “PNG solution”, which effectively bans refugees from arriving in Australia by boat, shocked the world and, rather than winning Labor the election, as some claimed at the time, instead shifted discourse on the subject dramatically to the right. It is a nasty and deeply shaming policy which would make any progressive voter hesitate before voting for Labor. Kevin Rudd himself is no longer loved by the population, but his later-life conversion to the cause of gay marriage is welcome. And on most policies Labor is stronger: the NBN (what kind of news organisation wouldn’t support the fastest possible internet?), Gillard’s gains in education and disability, and the globally-admired economy, with 22 years of uninterrupted growth.

    Inequality and poverty have barely been discussed; no one is talking about the disadvantaged, such as the unemployed, whose benefits even the Business Council considers too low, or single mothers, or Indigenous equality. There has been near-silence, too, on climate, even though Australia has more than most to lose from rising temperatures. Mr Abbott’s Direct Action policy is next to useless; Labor has failed to make the case for its emissions trading scheme. The Greens have at least attempted some kind of vision in this area, and also on asylum – Christine Milne’s barely-controlled fury at the closing of Australia to refugees arriving by boat was a big moment, a rare expression of genuine political passion.

    But among many voters, quite reasonably, there is a feeling of apathy and exhaustion. The parliament doesn’t look like Australia – the Coalition front bench has hardly any women, there is only one Indigenous Australian in parliament, very few Asian Australians, very few openly gay MPs. And when no one offers a vision for a better society, you’re left with a “what can you do for me?” kind of politics, which leads to atomisation and anger. Democratic argument has been reduced to a series of gaffes, “daggy dad” sexist moments (some probably carefully planned in advance), no-shows and banality. What will it take to rediscover a more inspiring politics for Australia?

    Depressing though it is, this is nevertheless a vote that must be taken seriously, as much is at stake. Labor is broken; the Liberals are hiding – but they are not the same. Mr Abbott has asked the Australian people to trust him, but he doesn’t trust them enough to give them the facts they need to make an informed decision. Those who choose the Coalition because they think Labor don’t deserve it might soon feel regret; those who vote on Saturday for change may be surprised what that change entails.

    But we are not going to try to tell you how to vote. Guardian Australia believes in encouraging many different voices, never just one. We are a truly independent news organisation – without a proprietor seeking political influence, without shareholders expecting quick returns, without chairmen with political axes to grind. In a digital age, news organisations which pronounce from on high the way their readers should vote are an anachronism. Digital media is more of a conversation with our readers, an ongoing dialogue, a collaboration. So tell us: who do you think has a better vision for Australian society? Who do you trust to govern the COUNTRY. who will you vote for on Saturday?

     

     

  • U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA – Independent Statistics and Analysis

    ‹ Countries

    Sudan and South Sudan   Sudan Energy Profile South Sudan Energy Profile

    Last Updated: September 5, 2013  (Notes)

    full report

    Overview

    South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in July 2011. Most of the oil is now produced in South Sudan, but the country is landlocked and remains dependent on Sudan because it must use Sudan’s export pipelines and processing facilities. In early 2012, South Sudan voluntarily shut in all of its oil production because of a dispute with Sudan over oil transit fees.

    The unified Sudan has been producing oil since the 1990s. Most of the producing assets are near or extend across the de facto border between Sudan and South Sudan. When South Sudan became independent in July 2011, it gained control over most of the oil production. But South Sudan is landlocked and remains dependent on Sudan because it must use Sudan’s export pipelines and processing facilities.

    In January 2012, South Sudan voluntarily shut in all of its oil production because of a dispute with Sudan over oil transit fees. Following South Sudan’s secession, Sudan requested transit fees of $32-36/barrel (bbl) in an attempt to make up for the oil revenue loss, while South Sudan offered a transit fee of less than $1/bbl. Tensions escalated at the end of 2011 when Sudan began to confiscate a portion of South Sudan’s oil as a payment for unpaid transit fees, and shortly after, South Sudan shut down production. After nearly 15 months of intermittent negotiations, South Sudan restarted oil production in April 2013. Despite the progress that has been made to reconcile differences, several unresolved issues remain and production may be curtailed again in the future.

    Oil plays a vital role in the economies of both countries. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), oil represented around 57 percent of Sudan’s total government revenue and around 78 percent of export earnings in 2011, while it represented around 98 percent of total government revenues for South Sudan in 2011. The IMF projected that Sudan’s oil earnings substantially declined following the South’s secession. According to IMF estimates, oil accounted for 32 percent of total export earnings and 30 percent of Sudan’s total government revenue in 2012.

    Historical background

    Prior to independence, the unified Sudan had fought two civil wars. The second civil war ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was put in place from 2005 to 2011. South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan in July 2011. However, there are still unresolved issues that have caused tension between both countries after independence. The border between the two countries is undefined and some areas along the border remain contested.

    Since its independence in 1956 from joint British and Egyptian rule, there have been several armed conflicts in Sudan that have affected the country’s economic development, particularly its natural resources. The longest conflicts in the unified Sudan were the two civil wars that were fought between the Northern Sudanese government in Sudan and the government in Southern Sudan (1955-1972 and 1983-2005). The North/South civil war ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was in place from 2005 to 2011.The CPA set standards for sharing oil revenue (50:50 split) and a timetable toward a referendum on the South’s independence. A referendum took place in January 2011 in which the people of the South voted to secede from Sudan. In July 2011, Sudan became two countries: Sudan (Khartoum) and South Sudan (Juba).

    The border separating Sudan and South Sudan is still not officially defined, and some areas remain contested. The current de facto border was established when Sudan gained independence in 1956; it is known as the 1956 border. The CPA called for the border to be demarcated, and a Technical Border Committee (TBC) was established in 2005 to demarcate the 1956 border. The committee agreed on most of the border, but five areas remain disputed, according to a report by the International Crisis Group.

    One of the most contentious areas, which was excluded in the TBC’s mandate, is the Abyei area, located between Northern Bahr al Ghazal, Warrap, and Unity states. Oil was discovered in Abyei in 1979, which escalated tensions between both sides. The Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) was authorized to define the territory, and in 2005 it ruled that the Heglig and Bamboo oil fields fell within Abyei. The North contested the ruling because it placed a significant portion of its oil reserves in the disputed territory. The dispute was later sent to The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. In 2009, PCA redefined the Abyei area and placed Heglig and the Bamboo fields outside of Abyei.

    A referendum was scheduled for January 2011 to determine whether Abyei would join Sudan or South Sudan, but this did not occur because of disagreements over voter eligibility. Although uncertainties over border demarcation and the ownership of Abyei remain, the Heglig and Bamboo fields are considered today to be in Sudan’s South Kordofan state.

    Oil

    Most of Sudan’s and South Sudan’s proved reserves of crude oil and natural gas are located in the Muglad and Melut basins, which extend into both countries. Natural gas associated with oil fields is flared or re-injected. Both countries currently do not produce or consume marketed natural gas.

    According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Sudan and South Sudan have 5 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves as of January 1, 2013. According to BP’s 2013 Statistical Review, approximately 3.5 million barrels are in South Sudan and 1.5 million barrels are in Sudan. The majority of reserves are located in the oil-rich Muglad and Melut basins, which extend into both countries. Oil is transported through two main pipelines that stretch from the landlocked South to Port Sudan. Because of civil conflict, oil exploration prior to the 2011 independence was mostly limited to the central and south-central regions of the unified Sudan.

    Natural gas associated with oil fields is mostly flared or re-injected. Despite proven reserves of 3 trillion cubic feet, gas development has been limited. In 2010, the unified Sudan flared approximately 11.8 billion cubic feet of natural gas, according to the latest data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which represents about 0.2 percent of the total gas flared globally.

    Oil sector regulation

    In Sudan, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MOFNE) regulates domestic refining and oil imports. The Sudanese Petroleum Corporation (SPC), an arm of the Ministry of Petroleum, is responsible for exploration, production, and distribution of crude oil and petroleum fuels in accordance with regulations set by the MOFNE. The SPC purchases crude oil at a subsidized cost from MOFNE and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). According to the IMF, SPC purchased light crude (Nile Blend) at a fixed price of $49/bbl, instead of the international price of $110/bbl for light crude, and $82/bbl for heavy crude (Fula Blend) in 2011.

    After purchasing the crude, SPC then contracts with local refineries to process it. It sells the domestically refined and imported fuels to distribution and marketing companies at subsidized prices set by the MOFNE, according to the IMF. Locally refined products are sold at a price lower than production costs, and imported fuels are sold below the cost of importation. The IMF estimated that fuel subsidies accounted for 14 percent of total government expenditures in 2011 and 15 percent in 2012. Fuel prices in Sudan are lower compared to nearby countries. According to the IMF, the subsidy is exported to neighboring countries as Sudan’s subsidized fuel is often smuggled across its borders.

    South Sudan created the 2012 Petroleum Act, which outlines the institutional framework governing the hydrocarbon sector. The Act established the National Petroleum and Gas Corporation (NPGC). NPGC is the main policymaking and supervisory body in the upstream, midstream, and downstream segments of the hydrocarbon sector and is authorized to approve petroleum agreements on the government’s behalf. The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the management of the petroleum sector.

    The Sudan National Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet) is the national oil company in Sudan, and the Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) is its counterpart in South Sudan. At the end of 2011, South Sudan nationalized Sudapet’s assets in the South and transferred them to Nilepet, according to a Foreign Reports Bulletin. Both companies are active in their respective country’s oil exploration and production and are often minority shareholders in joint ventures with foreign oil companies because of their limited technical expertise and financial resources.

    International oil companies

    International oil companies from Asia dominate the oil sectors of Sudan and South Sudan. The China National Petroleum Corporation, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, and Malaysia’s Petronas hold large stakes in the leading consortia operating oil fields and pipelines. National oil companies Sudapet (Sudan) and Nilepet (South Sudan) also hold small stakes in operations.

    International oil companies (IOCs), primarily from Asia, dominate the oil sectors in both countries. They are led by CNPC, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Malaysia’s Petronas. These companies hold large stakes in the leading consortia operating in both countries: the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the Dar Petroleum Operating Company, and the Sudd Petroleum Operating Company.

    Table 1: Main oil companies in Sudan and South Sudan
    Consortium/subsidiary Company Country of
    origin    		 Share
    (percent)
    Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) CNPC China 40
    Petronas Malaysia 30
    ONGC India 25
    Sudapet* Sudan 5
    Nilepet* South Sudan 5
    Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) CNPC China 41
    Petronas Malaysia 40
    Nilepet South Sudan 8
    Sinopec China 6
    Egypt Kuwait Holding Egypt 3.6
    Other partner(s) — 1.4
    Sudd Petroleum Operating Company (SPOC) Nilepet South Sudan 41.9375
    Petronas Malaysia 33.9375
    ONGC India 24.125
    Petro Energy E&P CNPC China 95
    Sudapet Sudan 5
    Star Oil Ansan Wikfs Yemen 66
    Sudapet Sudan 34
    Note: * Sudapet holds a 5-percent share in GNPOC’s operations in Sudan, and Nilepet holds a 5-percent share in GNPOC’s operations in South Sudan.
    Source: Company websites, IHS Edin, and Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)

    Production

    Oil production in Sudan and South Sudan is declining because of natural declines at maturing fields. Sudan has set ambitious goals to increase production from new fields and to increase recovery rates at existing fields, but production continues to fall short of Sudan’s goals.

    Today, nearly all the oil produced in Sudan and South Sudan originates from the Muglad Basin (Blocks 1, 2, and 4, Block 5A, Block 6, and Block 17) and Melut Basin (Blocks 3 and 7). Currently, oil produced from Blocks 2, 4, 6, and 17 is counted as Sudan’s production, while oil from Blocks 1, 3, and 7 belongs to South Sudan.

    Small-scale oil production in the unified Sudan began in 1992 and grew rapidly in 1999 with the completion of the GNPOC export pipeline that runs from the Heglig processing facility to Port Sudan. Total oil production reached its peak of 486,000 bb/d in 2010, but declined to around 453,000 bbl/d in 2011. The fall in output was driven by production declines due to maturing oil fields and lack of investment in Sudan, as well as a shortage of skilled workers in South Sudan in 2011. In April 2011, production was briefly disrupted in South Sudan when a number of North Sudanese workers in Southern fields were temporally expelled. For the remainder of 2011, some oil facilities experienced labor shortages that adversely affected production, as some skilled workers migrated back to the north after the secession.

    In 2012, combined production from Sudan and South Sudan plummeted to around 115,000 bbl/d because South Sudan shut in all of its production at the end of January 2012. In less than one month, South Sudan closed production at: Blocks 3 and 7, Block 1, and Block 5A. Total unplanned disruptions in both countries averaged about 315,000-320,000 bbl/d in 2012, and peaked at about 370,000 bbl/d in mid-2012 because of military clashes around Sudan’s Heglig field that temporarily halted production. The disruption estimates take into account adjustments to South Sudan’s effective capacity and assumes that a portion of pre-shut-in production was compromised because of technical issues surrounding the shut-in and its duration.

    Sudan had set ambitious goals to increase its output to more than 180,000 bbl/d by the end of 2012. However, the country’s production continued to fall mostly because of natural declines and, to a lesser extent, unplanned disruptions. Production was disrupted at the Heglig field in Block 2 for several months in mid-2012 after military clashes between Sudan and South Sudan resulted in a temporary halt in production and significant damage to the central processing facility. Oil fields at Sudan’s Block 6, which produce the Fula blend that is refined and consumed domestically, experienced natural declines. At the end of 2012, Sudan brought two new fields online: the Hadida field in Block 6 and al-Barasaya in Block 17. Hadida and al-Barasaya are expected to reach capacity before the end of 2013 at 20,000 bbl/d and 10,000-15,000bbl/d, respectively.

    Despite falling short of its production goal in 2012, Sudan still hopes to boost production in the future by ramping up new fields and increasing oil recovery rates at existing fields. Sudan recently launched bidding for blocks that are clearly located in Sudan and included some offshore acreage. In addition, Sudan signed an agreement with Norway in 2012 to increase oil recovery rates at current fields from 23 percent to 47 percent, according to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES). According to MEES, this is likely a long-term strategy, and it would take time before clear increases are noticeable.

    Table 2: Sudan and South Sudan oil fields, blends, and operators
    Country Location Main fields Blend Operator
    Sudan Block 2 Heglig, Bamboo Nile GNPOC
    Sudan Block 4 Diffra, Neem Nile GNPOC
    Sudan Block 6 Fula, Hadida Fula Petro Energy
    Sudan Block 17 al-Barasaya NA Star Oil
    South Sudan Block 1 Unity, Toma, Munga Nile GNPOC
    South Sudan Block 3 & 7 Palogue, Adar-Yale Dar DPOC
    South Sudan Block 5A Mala, Thar Jath Nile SPOC
    Source: Rystad, Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), and Energy Intelligence Group

    Negotiations, cooperation agreements, and oil production restart

    While oil production was shut in, representatives from Sudan and South Sudan met several times in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for negotiations that were mediated by the African Union. After months of impasse, Sudan and South Sudan reached a provisional agreement on oil transit fees in August 2012. Both sides agreed upon a transit fee of $8.40/bbl for the use of the pipeline that transports the Nile Blend from Heglig to Port Sudan and $6.50/bbl for the use of the Petrodar pipeline that delivers the Dar Blend produced in Blocks 3 and 7 to Port Sudan. An additional $2.60/bbl processing and transit fee was included, which raised the total fee to $11/bbl and $9.10/bbl, respectively. Both countries also agreed that South Sudan would pay its neighbor $3.028 billion over the course of three and a half years to compensate for the loss of oil revenue. Although the agreement signified a major step forward, officials in Sudan refused to reach a deal on when to restart oil production until a pact on security issues was achieved.

    On September 27, 2012, both sides signed a series of cooperation agreements on a host of post-independence issues, such as sharing oil revenue, border demarcation, security, migration, banking, and trade.

    The agreement on oil called for the resumption of oil production in South Sudan and granted that country access to use oil transportation and processing facilities in Sudan. It stipulates that South Sudan will pay Sudan processing, transit, and transportation fees to use facilities and pipelines in Sudan. The total fee to use the GNPOC facilities and pipeline is $11/bbl; the Petrodar facilities and pipeline fee is $9.10/bbl, as agreed upon in the August 2012 provisional agreement. The $3.028 billion compensation can be paid over time at a rate of $15/bbl and must be paid within three and a half years. The total fees associated with moving the crude oil to Sudan’s export terminal, in addition to the compensation fee, bring the total payment to $24.10/bbl for Petrodar and $26/bbl for GNPOC.

    Both sides agreed to cancel and forgive any claims of oil-related arrears and outstanding financial claims. This includes South Sudan’s previous claims that Sudan diverted the South’s crude oil to the refinery in Sudan. However, Sudan is still expected to give the South proceeds from the oil confiscated prior to the shutdown and shipped by the Trafigura Group in February 2012. The agreement on oil also stipulates that if operations related to production or use of processing and/or transportation facilities becomes technically or economically unsustainable, then the country must provide a 60-day notice prior to shutting down production or suspending access to processing and transportation facilities.

    The agreement on security arrangements called for a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between the shared de facto border. Both sides agreed to withdraw 6 miles from the border to minimize military clashes in the designated 14-mile buffer zone. It also operationalized the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission to oversee and verify the withdrawal. The agreement also reinforced the pledge made by both countries to not lend support to rebel groups against the other country.

    On March 12, 2013, Sudan and South Sudan released an implementation matrix with a timeline to carry out the activities in the cooperation agreements. Most notably, the implementation matrix set dates to demilitarize the buffer zone along the shared border and to restart oil production. South Sudan resumed limited oil production on April 6, 2013. Initial production of 4,000 to 6,000 bbl/d came from the Thar Jath field in Block 5A. Production at South Sudan’s largest fields in the Upper Nile State (Blocks 3 and 7) started about one month later.

    Although production has finally resumed, it is still unclear whether there will be another prolonged shut-in in the near future. In May 2013, shortly after production resumed, South Sudan was forced to partially shut in production for a few days at Blocks 3 and 7 after Sudan turned off the pump station at the central processing facility in Jebelein, Sudan. Sudan claimed it turned off the pump station because of technical problems, but South Sudan believes the decision was politically motivated. The pump station was returned to operations, and the South was able to avoid significant economic and environmental costs that would have occurred if oil flows were disrupted for a longer period of time because of the lack of storage space near the fields.

    The main issue that is fueling tension between the two countries is the support for rebel groups. Sudan presented South Sudan with a 60-day notice, starting on June 9, to cut off access to its two main export pipelines after accusing South Sudan of backing rebels that are trying to overtake Sudan’s government in Khartoum, an allegation that South Sudan denies. Sudan had postponed the deadline to close the pipelines twice to allow the African Union more time to investigate the allegations and for further negotiations. In early September, Sudan reported that it would continue to allow South Sudan to export its oil through Sudan’s pipelines.

    Oil pipelines

    Sudan has two export pipelines that travel northbound across the country to the Bashayer (Bashair) Marine Terminal, located about 15 miles south of Port Sudan. The Petrodar pipeline transports the Dar Blend, a heavy sour crude, from South Sudan’s Blocks 3 and 7. The Dar Blend sells at a discount to the Nile Blend along with Brent, the international benchmark for the crude oil price. The pipeline stretches 850 miles, and its design (maximum) capacity is 500,000 bbl/d. It includes several heating units along its length because of the waxy, acidic nature of the crude. The Petrodar pipeline was reportedly filled with water during the time that oil production was shut down.

    The GNPOC pipeline transports the Nile Blend, a medium, low-sulfur waxy crude oil, 1,000 miles from the Heglig processing facilities to the Bashayer Marine Terminal. The pipeline has a design capacity of 450,000 bbl/d. The Nile Blend is sourced from Blocks 2 (Heglig and Bamboo fields) and 4 (Diffra and Neem fields) in Sudan and Blocks 1 (Unity field) and 5A (Mala and Thar Jath fields) in South Sudan. Production from all of the oil fields serving the GNPOC pipeline has been naturally declining since 2007. The pipeline remained open during the production shutdown and transported crude oil from Sudan’s fields.

    South Sudan is considering the construction of an export crude oil pipeline that would allow the country to bypass the current route through Sudan. South Sudan has been discussing their options with authorities in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to possibly build a pipeline either to the Kenyan Port of Lamu or to the Port of Djibouti via Ethiopia. South Sudan has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with all three governments to build the pipelines. The latest news on the topic is that Japan’s Toyota Tsusho Corporation completed a feasibility study to construct the pipeline to the Port of Lamu and may finance and build the pipeline.

    An alternative pipeline route would reduce South Sudan’s reliance on Sudan, but the pipeline’s construction could take at least two years. In addition, there are no major oil fields scheduled to come online in South Sudan and production has been projected to decline substantially in the next five years, according to a Foreign Reports Bulletin released in March 2012.

    Table 3: Crude oil pipelines in Sudan and South Sudan
    Operator Start Destination Blend type Aprox. length
    (miles)    		 Design capacity
    (‘000 bbl/d)
    Main crude oil pipelines
    DPOC Block 3 and 7 Bashayer Terminal 2, Port Sudan Dar 850 500
    GNPOC Heglig facilities Bashayer Terminal 1, Port Sudan Nile 1000 450
    SPOC Block 5A Connects to Heglig facilities Nile 60 200
    CNPC Block 6 Khartoum Refinery Fula 450 200
    Proposed crude oil pipelines
    — South Sudan Lamu (Kenya) — — 450
    — South Sudan Djibouti via Ethiopia — — —
    Note: The Bashayer (Bashair) Marine Terminal is located about 15 miles south of Port Sudan.
    Source: Petrodar, GNPOC, Energy Intelligence Group, and IHS Edin

    Crude oil exports

    China is the leading export destination for crude oil from Sudan and South Sudan. In 2011, Sudan’s crude exports accounted for 5 percent of China’s total crude oil imports, but in 2012 this share fell to less than 1 percent because of the production shutdown in South Sudan.

    Sudan and South Sudan export the Nile and Dar blends mostly to Asian markets. According to estimates based on data from Global Trade Atlas and FACTS Global Energy, total crude oil exports, including lease condensate, averaged around 337,000 bbl/d in 2011. China imported 260,000 bbl/d from Sudan in 2011, which accounted for 5 percent of total Chinese crude imports, according to FACTS Global Energy.

    In 2012, crude oil exports from Sudan and South Sudan plummeted to average almost 63,000 bbl/d, much of which was shipped in the first couple of months of the year and represents crude oil that was produced before South Sudan shut in production. China still remained the leading recipient for Sudanese crude and imported slightly more than 50,000 bbl/d in 2012, which accounted for less than 1 percent of total Chinese crude imports.

    Oil refining and consumption

    Oil consumption in Sudan and South Sudan increased by an annual average of around 10 percent between 2000 and 2011 and reached its highest level of 132,000 bbl/d in 2011, most of which was consumed by Sudan. Oil consumption grew because of increased industrialization, improved access to the electricity grid, and rising car ownership, according to the IMF. However, oil consumption decreased to 95,000 bbl/d in 2012, nearly a 30-percent drop from the previous year, as Sudan’s economy was affected by the loss of export revenue when South Sudan’s oil production was shut down.

    Oil consumption is supplied by domestically refined crude oil, along with imported refined products. Diesel, used for electricity generation and transportation, accounts for most of the consumption, followed by gasoline (transportation) and fuel oil (electricity), according to the IMF. The countries also import diesel, jet oil (aviation), and LPG (cooking and heating) to supplement domestic supply. Sudan and South Sudan export small quantities of refined products, mostly to neighboring countries.

    Sudan has two full conversion refineries with a total crude oil distillation capacity of 121,700 bbl/d and three small topping plants with a total capacity of 22,000 bbl/d. The largest refinery, the Khartoum or al-Jaili refinery, is located just north of Khartoum and has a crude distillation capacity of 100,000 bbl/d. It initially came online in 2000 with a capacity of 50,000 bbl/d to process the Nile Blend. The refinery’s capacity was expanded in 2006 to also process Sudan’s highly acidic Fula Blend. According to one of its operators, CNPC, the Khartoum Refinery was the world’s first modern refinery with a delayed coking unit for high-acid and high-calcium crude oil.

    The country’s other full conversion refinery is the Port Sudan refinery (21,700 bbl/d). The three small topping plants are El Obeid (10,000 bbl/d), Shajirah (10,000 bbl/d), and Abu Gabra (2,000 bbl/d). The Malaysian company Petronas had planned to construct a 100,000-bbl/d refinery in Port Sudan, but plans have been frequently postponed and no progress has been reported.

    South Sudan announced that it plans to open a small refinery in Unity State this year with initial capacity of 5,000 bbl/d and a second refinery in the Upper Nile State next year with initial capacity of 10,000 bbl/d.

    Table 4: Oil refineries in Sudan and South Sudan
    Country Refinery Capacity
    (000 bbl/d)    		 Operator
    Sudan Khartoum (al-Jaili) 100 CNPC/Sudanese government
    Port Sudan 21.7 Sudan Petroleum Corporation
    Topping plants
    El Obeid 10 Sudan Petroleum Corporation
    Shajirah 10 Concorp
    Abu Gabra 2 Sudan Petroleum Corporation
    Total Capacity 143.7
    Planned refineries
    South Sudan Unity State (Bentiu) —
    Upper Nile (Tangrial) 10  Ventech Engineers International
    Proposed refineries
    Sudan Port Sudan 100 —
    Khartoum (expansion) 100 —
    Note: For proposed refineries, progress has been slow, and future plans are unclear.
    Source: Embassy of Sudan (Malaysia), Sudan Petroleum Corporation, Arab Oil & Gas Journal, the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), IHS Edin, and IHS World Markets Energy

    Electricity

    The unified Sudan generated 8.1 billion kilowatthours (KWh) of electricity in 2010. Almost all was generated from oil (3.8 KWh) and hydroelectricity (3.8 KWh), with the remaining 6 percent from biomass and waste (0.5 KWh). Although power generation almost tripled between 2000 and 2010, millions of people are still without access to electricity. According to the latest 2009 estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA), about 36 percent of the population had access to electricity, higher than the regional average for Sub-Saharan Africa, which was almost 31 percent.

    According to Sudan’s Dams Implementation Unit, electricity is transmitted through two interconnected regional grids, the Blue Nile and Western grids. The grids cover only a small portion of the country, and the parts not connected to the grid depend on small diesel-fired generators or wood fuel (traditional biomass) for power. Power plants connected to the grid use diesel and residual fuels, according to IHS CERA. Using natural gas to generate electricity could reduce energy costs, but Sudan’s natural gas sector is undeveloped; as associated gas at oil fields is flared or re-injected. Hydroelectricity is generated from five dams: Roseires, Sinnar, Jebel Aulia, Khashm el-Girba, and Merowe. The newest hydro plant, Merowe, is located on the Nile River and has the country’s largest generation capacity at 1,250 Megawatts (MW). According to IHS CERA, South Sudan has around 20 MW of total installed capacity that is fueled by oil. The largest source of power is the 12-MW Warsila plant in Juba, South Sudan. According to EIA’s latest estimate, total electricity installed capacity in both countries was 2,338 MW in 2010.

  • If Abbott is elected, Australia’s natural wonders will gradually be rubbed away

    If Abbott is elected, Australia’s natural wonders will gradually be rubbed away

    Tony Abbott’s climate policies are about removing the social and environmental protections enjoyed by all Australians to allow the filthy rich to become richer – and filthier

    The expansion of the coal port at Abbot Point would threaten coral, dugongs, turtles, dolphins and much of the rest of the great barrier reef’s profusion of life.
    The expansion of the coal port at Abbot Point would threaten coral, dugongs, turtles, dolphins and much of the rest of the Great Barrier Reef’s profusion of life. Photograph: Graeme Robertson

    His views have changed, but don’t expect Tony Abbott to acknowledge this, let alone apologise to Australians for misleading them. In 2009 he maintained that manmade climate change is “absolute crap”. Now he says “I think that climate change is real, humanity makes a contribution.” But he has merely switched from denying global warming to denying the need to act on it.

    Abbott is following a familiar script – the 4 Ds of climate change inaction promoted by fossil fuel lovers the world over. Deny, then defer, then delay, then despair.

    His Direct Action program for reducing emissions is incapable of delivering the cuts it promises, absurdly underfunded and surrounded by a swarm of unanswered questions. Were it to become big enough to meet its promises, it would be far more expensive than a comparable carbon trading scheme, which Abbott has falsely claimed would incur “almost unimaginable” costs. But it won’t be big enough, because he refuses to set aside the money it requires. Direct Action is a program designed to create a semblance of policy, in the certain knowledge that it will fail to achieve its objectives.

    Why? The answer’s in the name. Coalition policies begin with coal: getting it out of the ground, moving it through the ports, stripping away the regulations that prevent mining companies from wrecking the natural beauty of Australia – and from trashing the benign climate on which we all depend. The mining boom in the world’s biggest coal exporter has funded a new, harsher politics.

    Climate change protesters wait for Tony Abbott at Penrice Soda Holdings in Adelaide.
    Climate change protesters wait for Tony Abbott at Penrice Soda Holdings in Adelaide. Photograph: Alan Porritt/AAP

    Like the tar sands in Canada, coal has changed the character of the nation, brutalising and degrading public life. It has funded a vicious campaign of mud-slinging against those who argue for the careful use of resources, for peace and quiet and beauty and the health of the living planet. Australia, like Nigeria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, suffers from a resource curse.

    To those four Ds you can add an R: retreat. Like Canada, Australia is slipping back down the development ladder, switching from secondary and tertiary industries towards primary resource extraction. Note Abbott’s disparagement of what he calls a “restaurant-led economy” in Tasmania, and his intention to replace it with the businesses that preceded it: logging and pulping, mining and unregulated fishing. A 21st century nation is returning to a 19th century economy. It makes no financial sense, but mining and logging corporations are more powerful lobbyists that restauranteurs and eco-tourism companies.

    That R also makes the difference between coal and coral. If, as we can expect, Abbott allows a massive expansion of the coal port at Abbot Point, which means the dredging and dumping of 3m cubic metres of material inside the Great Barrier Reef marine park, it would threaten coral, dugongs, turtles, dolphins and much of the rest of the reef’s profusion of life. If it happens, it will be a simple declaration that nothing – not even the Great Barrier Reef, on which so much of Australia’s image and revenue depends – will be allowed to stand in the way of extraction and destruction.

    Abbott will dump coal onto the bonfire of environmental protection lit by some of the state governments. He intends to cut what he calls “green tape” – the rules that protect humankind’s common heritage from greed and selfishness – and withdraw the federal powers that are often the last line of defence against state governments captured by the industries they are supposed to regulate.

    None of this is to suggest that Labor has distinguished itself on these issues. The announcements of the past few weeks look like a last minute scramble to help voters forget its record of vacillation and cowardice. Labor’s failure to protect the natural world ensures that Abbott’s philistinism is harder to contest. As usual, it’s only the Greens who have consistently been advocating responsibility and statesmanship.

    It’s been bad enough under Gillard and Rudd. If Abbott is elected, the natural wonders that distinguish this nation will gradually be rubbed away until it looks like anywhere else: a degraded landscape and seascape, supporting just a few generic exotic species.

    The country will be run exclusively for the class to which Gina Rinehart, Clive Palmer and Ivan Glasenberg belong: the 1% of the 1%. Forget the pious rhetoric and nationalistic bombast. Abbott’s policies are really about removing the social and environmental protections enjoyed by all Australians, to allow the filthy rich to become richer – and filthier.

  • Mr Rudd remains a mystery to us all

    Mr Rudd remains a mystery to us all

    By ABC’s Annabel Crabb
    (He will be battling to retain his own seat)

     

    Posted 1 hour 36 minutes ago

    What will happen after the election if, as expected, Labor loses? It depends on what Kevin does, Labor people will tell you. And no-one knows how that’s going to go, writes Annabel Crabb.

    Tomorrow brings to a head a most memorable three-way fistfight: Kevin Rudd versus the Labor Party versus the Australian people.

    Was there ever a struggle so strange?

    Ordinarily, leaders use their parties as loudhailers through which they talk to the electorate.

    Kevin Rudd, with his knack for structural complexity, has pioneered a much more ornate model; the leader who hopes and trusts that voters will love him despite his party, with which he is terminally at odds.

    There is little doubt that the Labor Party, as an organisation, has done its best to expel Kevin Michael Rudd, still just 55 years old, still from Queensland and still – apparently endlessly – here to help.

    It has in turn tolerated him, marvelled at him, adored him, exploited him, resented him, turned on him in unspeakable brutality, humiliated him, feared him, gone back to him cap in hand, and even now – on the eve of what may be quite a memorable defeat – it still has no idea of what he is going to do.

    What will happen after the election, if – as is widely supposed – Labor loses? It depends on what Kevin does, Labor people will tell you. And no-one knows how that’s going to go.

    When Rudd’s popularity first soared, they indulged him. When it flagged, they turned on him. When it rekindled, they swallowed their pride.

     

    The presence of a genuinely indomitable will in a group of otherwise intelligent adults can produce confounding degrees of passivity. That passivity was there when the parliamentary Labor Party elected Kevin Rudd to be their leader – after years of privately mocking him – because they figured he wouldn’t go away.

    It was there when, during Rudd’s first term as prime minister, his blinding popularity ratings conscripted the majority of them to a vast conspiracy of silence as to his various dysfunctions. Then came the great insurrection of June 2010 – a classic crime of passion, in which the downtrodden collectively overcame their helplessness and rose up in a blind act of defiance, again with no idea how he would react.

    But it didn’t take all that long, really, for fretful dependence to re-establish itself, and for some in the party to wonder if they wouldn’t be better off getting back together after all.

    Kevin Rudd’s power within the Caucus has always been a direct function of his popularity outside it.

    When it first soared, they indulged him. When it flagged, they turned on him. When it rekindled, they swallowed their pride.

    And while no-one can ever properly understand what makes a person stick around in politics, particularly once they’ve been stomped on and sacked live on CNN, it seems fairly evident that Mr Rudd’s unwavering trust in his relationship with the Australian people – his conviction that they love and continue to want him – bore him through those difficult times.

     

    In the electorate of Griffith, the giant billboards read, simply, “Kevin”, or “It’s Our Ruddy Future”. Like the group morning walks, in which a group of T-Shirted young volunteers forms an ambulant doughnut of adoration around the Prime Minister, or the school visits during which he bathes in a restorative solution of teen hysteria, their message is clear: Here is a leader who thrives on love, and who for years has kept fighting on the conviction it’s still out there.

    Of all the questions raised by Australian politics of late, this is the one to which tomorrow will provide an answer: Was he wrong, all this time?

    All this seems horribly harsh, I know.

    And for all Mr Rudd’s serial difficulties with the people who have been his closest workmates, there is no denying his extraordinary ability – developed, like most of his skills, thanks to a combination of natural aptitude and relentless application – to build a bond of trust and affection with people he has never met.

    To them, he is never short-tempered or unreasonable; to them, his greatest and most human qualities are uninterruptedly apparent.

    Poking around last night, I found something I wrote about Mr Rudd in 2009 after the Black Saturday bushfires, whose victims experienced the Prime Minister’s considerable capacity for kindness to strangers:

    With colleagues and staff, he can be icy and forbidding; he is merciless in his demands on their time and energies, and those who disappoint learn to dread the long, cold stare which is his most chilling expression of reproach.

    There is a mercilessness about his conduct in politics which has always ensured his essential isolation there. And yet the plight of a stranger can move him to extraordinary feats of kindness and attention.

    The Herald reported last year that Rudd – as shadow foreign affairs spokesman – was so moved by the wretched story of condemned drug trafficker Van Nguyen in 2005 that he sent his own father’s precious Bible for the boy to pray with in his last hours. He is especially touched by homelessness, by dispossession, by children who lose parents and by parents who lose children.

    Coalition MPs, who think Rudd a cold fish, have been surprised by the sincerity of his concern; he has kept in touch by phone with anyone who has stricken constituents. Humility is not a big part of the Rudd political profile, but he was humble in the face of a stinging public letter from the journalist and bushfire victim Gary Hughes, who denounced the Government for enforcing inflexible Centrelink processes.

    Where does this story end? Would it end, for instance, with a decisive result in the House of Representatives tomorrow night? How many seats would need to fall for Kevin Rudd to relinquish the belief that his own vocation for leadership of the Australian people was thwarted only by the inconstancy of his own party colleagues?

    Even if the loss is very heavy, I am yet to talk to any Labor person who is absolutely certain that such a result would cause Kevin Rudd to retire from politics. After all these years, that’s how well they know him: Not at all.

    Annabel Crabb is the ABC’s chief online political writer. View her full profile here.

    More election coverage on The Drum:

  • Major parties missing in action on nano regulation

    Major parties missing in action on nano regulation

    Whilst the Australian Greens have pledged their support for a mandatory register of all nanomaterials in commercial use in the lead up to the Federal Election, the other major parties appear to be missing in action when it comes to regulating the risks associated with nanotechnology.

    Government progress towards regulating nano forms of existing chemicals appears to have stalled. Meanwhile, despite their past emphasis on building public trust in nanotechnology oversight, the Coalition failed to answer Friends of the Earth’s Federal Election policy questionnaire.

    Nanotechnology, the ‘science of the small’, has received generous funding from the past Coalition and current Labor governments alike. Yet in this election campaign the Coalition has avoided public scrutiny of their policy position on managing nanotechnology’s new health and environment risks, ensuring the right of workers and the public to know whether they face nano-exposure, and tackling nanotechnology’s social challenges.

    The United Kingdom’s Royal Society has called for all nanomaterials to be subject to safety testing by scientific authorities prior to their inclusion in commercial products. While Australia’s chemical regulator the National Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS) has regulated nano forms of new chemicals, it appears that moves to regulate nano forms of existing chemicals have stalled.

    The Government has opposed labelling of nanomaterials for informed choice. Whilst the EU and New Zealand move to regulate nano-ingredients in sunscreen, our sunscreen regulator the Therapeutic Goods Administration has opposed the labelling of nano-ingredients in sunscreen. This is despite consumer groups, unions, public health advocates and even the sunscreen industry itself calling for it!

    While a number of European countries including France, Belgium, Denmark and Norway are moving to implement mandatory registers of nanomaterials our Federal Government has refused to take similar action here.

    With the cessation of its National Enabling Technology Strategy (NETS) this year, the Government has dramatically scaled back funding for Safe Work Australia’s research on the occupational health and safety risks associated with nanomaterials.

    The ALP has stated that “Federal Labor will continue to encourage public participation in decision making and consultations on government policy making processes”. However, it is not clear how this will take place, given that the government has abandoned its NETS community engagement program. It also scrapped its Stakeholder Advisory Council and Expert Forums – set up to consider important issues that may arise in the development or use of new technologies and provide advice to Government on 
ways it could address those issues.

    From their response to our election questionnaire, Friends of the Earth is pleased to see that the Australian Greens support measures such as ensuring mandatory labelling of nano-ingredients, providing greater funding for social research and supporting a greater role for the public in nanotechnology decision making. We are disappointed that the Australian Labor Party could not do the same. We are even more concerned that the Coalition is totally missing in action when it comes to nanotechnology policy.

    Download the election questionnaire

    Download the Australian Greens response to the questionnaire 

    Download the Australian Labor Party response to the questionnaire 

    Authorised by Louise Sales, 100 Elizabeth Street, Hobart, 7000
    Attachment Size
    ALP response to nano survey 2013.pdf 356.08 KB
    Greens Friends of the Earth_nanotechnology_response_19.7.13-1.pdf 272.74 KB